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ABSTRACT
The essays within this thesis investigate a series of issues of a complex and varied 
phenomenon: migration. In the first essay we investigate the effects of regional economic 
integration on the incentive for labour to spatially relocate. By introducing skill heterogeneity 
and localised human capital externalities in a basic, new economic geography model we 
provide a framework for re-interpreting the basic core-periphery model as a brain drain 
model. Incentives and timing of migration of highly skilled individuals depend on the process 
of goods market integration. When trade costs are high, as in the traditional core-periphery 
model, a dispersed equilibrium with no incentive to migiate is a stable outcome. The initial 
phase of regional economic integration is characterised by a brain drain: the highly skilled 
have stronger incentives to migrate and will compose the initial wave of migrants. If 
integration comes to a halt, a positive self-selection of the migrants (with all of the highly 
skilled in one region in my model) might be a stable equilibrium. Eventually, if regional 
economic integration proceeds, further low-skilled migrants might find it convenient to 
follow the same pattern. These will lead to a complete agglomeration of all footloose workers 
in the core region. The results of the paper show the existence of a range of trade costs for 
which only high-skilled workers have an incentive to migrate. Therefore the benefit of 
introducing labour heterogeneity in the basic core-periphery model is to enable us to explain 
one of the most striking features o f interregional migration patterns, the positive self­
selection of the migrants.
The second essay moves in the direction of learning more about the micro-level migiatory 
behaviour of talented individuals in the context of a peripheral region. The ability of a 
regional system to generate human capital is cmcial, but it is not a sufficient condition 
leading to economic success. In this work we emphasise the importance of maintaining and 
attracting highly skilled and educated individuals and the challenges that migration flows 
pose for policymaking aimed at fostering human capital accumulation in peripheral regions. 
We employ a unique data set generated through a postal survey designed and conducted by 
the author. The focus of our analysis is on the micro-level location decisions of a sample of 
highly educated and skilled individuals residing in Basilicata, a small Italian Mezzogiorno 
region, who have benefited from a locally funded human capital investment policy. Thanks to 
the quality and riclmess of the data employed, we are able to conduct a very detailed analysis 
of the migration propensities on the basis of individual’s characteristics. We find that even 
within a fairly homogeneous group of highly skilled and educated individuals the probability 
to move is higher for the most talented. Individuals migration propensity considerably differ 
according to the subjects and the locations of attendance of their studies. In addition, we 
investigate what are the regional characteristics that make a region attractive for highly 
educated and talented individuals. The results of the analysis constitute a valuable knowledge 
that can be used in a strategic way to formulate talent attraction and retention policies.
In the last essay, we extend previous models of migration networks and ethnic communities 
formation by considering migration as etlinic-community-wide phenomena where established 
migrants strategically provide support to newcomers. The incentive to provide support is 
associated with positive externalities which new waves of migrants might have on migiants 
already settled in the host location. Culturally-based tastes for particular goods and services 
generate an ethnic consumer demand and only individuals from the same ethnic community 
have the skills or the “insider’s information” required to provide these goods (protected 
market). If the ethnic population is large enough, an ethnic sector will emerge and eventually 
grow as the ethnic population expands further.
According to the degree of preferences toward ethnic consumption, the mobility costs of the 
source locality population and congestion costs (hostility externalities) in the host location, 
alternative scenarios may arise. These scenarios provide a possible explanation of why 
different groups of migrants show different migration dynamics.
Keywords: interregional migration, economic geography, core-periphery model, discrete 
choice analysis, human capital, brain drain, migiation networks, consumption externalities, 
ethnic clusters, ethnic goods
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Plan of the Research
By Nicola Danieie Coniglio
Migi’ation is a complex and varied phenomenon. Its determinants and consequences have 
attracted the interest of scholars in different disciplines, such as demogi’aphy, economics, 
sociology and urban planning, just to name the most obvious. This interest is hardly 
suiprising given the importance of migration as a powerful mechanism of change for our 
economies, our societies and, in general, the “space” where we live.
Subsequent waves of researchers have enlarged the field of observation and 
investigated many different aspects of human migration, considerably expanding our 
knowledge on this fascinating subject. A rather incomplete list of issues addressed by recent 
literature would include: the determinants of internal and international migration flows, the 
economic performance of migrants relative to non-migrants, the role of migration as an 
adjustment to regional economic imbalances, and the effects of migiation on both those left 
behind and on natives in the place of destination.
This thesis focuses on a selected set of issues in this vast literature on migration 
studies. My research journey has been strongly influenced by my personal experience and by 
the actual and historical socio-economic environment of the area where I have spent most of 
my life, the so-called Italian Mezzogiorno. I will now outline in more detail the different 
stages of my research and describe the contents of the pages to follow.
Regional Economic Integration and the Mobility o f  Highly Skilled Individuals
The starting point of my research enterprise literally coincided with the moment I took the 
train from Bari (south-east of the Italian Mezzogiorno) to Milan (the economic “core” of 
Italy), namely the beginning of my travel to Glasgow where in 1999 I started my doctoral 
programme in economics.
It was not the first time I took the Bari-Milan line, but it was the first time that I 
realised how different is the flow of travellers from South to North compared to those 
travelling the opposite way. The stereotype of a South-to-North traveller, with the obvious 
simplifications, is a young woman (or man) with a university degree in her pocket. The 
luggage she is carrying is full of gastronomic delicacies prepared by her mother, the precious 
stock that will probably not last until the next weekend spent at home. She is probably on her 
first move to a job located in the North. The fact that you observe a laptop bag among her 
belonging tells you a lot on how the nature of migration has changed along this South-North 
route. Not many years ago, the image of a typical migrant was that of a man with a valigia di 
cartone (old cardboard suitcase), relatively unskilled and speaking almost only the local 
dialect. To sum up, this train slowly carries northward its load of young and highly educated 
individuals.
When the journey is taken in the opposite direction, from North to South, the average 
age dramatically increases along with a reduction of the average level of education and skills. 
On the train you will find tourists travelling South, to enjoy the sun and the above-mentioned 
gastronomic delicacies. Along with them will be returning former migrants, those of the 
cardboard suitcase, who plan to spend their retirement in their village of origin.
Obviously, this impressionist picture I formed is far from being a scientific 
observation but it was enough to stimulate my interest and curiosity on the issue of migration 
of educated and skilled individuals from peripheral regions.
Several studies have demonstrated that some groups of individuals are more 
geographically mobile and more reactive to regional wage differentials than others. In the 
migration literature the fact that economic migrants tend to be, on average, more skilled, 
young, educated and entrepreneurial than similar individuals who choose to remain in their 
place of origin, is a standard proposition (known as the positive self-selection o f the 
migrants), A better understanding of the pattern of migration is important for assessing the 
economic and sociological consequences for the origin and destination regions. The more 
migrants are favourably selected, the more beneficial will be their impact on the destination 
economy. On the other hand, such a selection will have, in general, a more adverse effect on 
the origin region (known as the brain drain).
The issue of the brain drain has undergone a recent revival. The debate is fierce not 
only in developing countries where the brain drain has been historically severe, but also 
among policymakers and economists in developed countries. The Italian Mezzogiorno 
represents a reality where this debate is particularly intense.
In my opinion, the phenomenon of brain drain within a country goes hand in hand 
with the phenomenon of agglomeration of economic activities into core regions and regional 
centralisation of human capital. The fundamental asymmetry and selectivity between 
interregional migration flows in the Italian Mezzogiorno, as in other peripheral regions, are 
the evident consequences of regional economic disparities. Is it possible that asymmetry is 
not only the consequence but also one of the major causes of regional economic imbalances? 
The first part of my research is devoted to this issue. If human capital flows from where it is 
scarce to where it is abundant, as Lucas (1988) argues, migration might worsen regional
economic imbalances rather than, as a neoclassical model would predict, reduce such 
imbalances.
The economic geography framework offers useful insights into the analysis of the 
brain drain and its consequences. The strength of the economic geography explanation of the 
brain drain lies in its explicit general equilibrium nature which gives internal consistency to 
the analysis. Agglomeration of highly skilled workers in core regions is a consequence of 
economic integration and the reduction of trade costs in the tradable sector. Spatial 
unevenness and centralisation of human capital in core locations might result even when 
regions have identical starting points.
In my first chapter, by introducing skill heterogeneity and localised human capital 
externalities in a basic, new economic geography model (Krugman, 1991) I provide a 
framework for re-interpreting the basic core-periphery model as a brain drain model.
Incentives and “timing” of migration of highly skilled individuals depend on the 
process of goods market integration. When trade costs are high, as in the traditional core- 
periphery model, a dispersed equilibrium with no incentive to migrate is a stable outcome. 
The initial phase of regional economic integration is characterised by a brain drain: the highly 
skilled have stronger incentives to migrate and will compose the initial wave of migrants. If 
integration comes to a halt, a positive self-selection of the migrants (with all of the highly 
skilled in one region in my model) might be a stable equilibrium. Eventually, if regional 
economic integration proceeds, further low-skilled migrants might find it convenient to 
follow the same pattern. These will lead to a complete agglomeration of all footloose workers 
in the core region, as in the Krugman model.
The results of the paper show the existence of a range of trade costs for which only 
high-skilled workers have an incentive to migrate. Therefore the benefit of introducing labour 
heterogeneity in the basic core-periphery model is to enable us to explain one of the most
striking features of interregional migration patterns, the positive self-selection of the 
migrants. Another important implication of the model is the existence of a persistent wage 
and productivity differential between the core and peripheral regions, which is due to two 
main factors: the sorting of highly skilled individuals in the core and localised human capital 
externalities associated with the skilled density in the core. This prediction has been 
supported by a recent strand of empirical literature to which 1 refer in more detail later in this 
thesis.
In my opinion, the simple framework developed in this initial part of my research 
journey, contributes an explanation o f the nature of actual interregional migration between 
core and peripheral regions across the European Union. It has been argued that the size of the 
interregional flows between and within European countries is rather limited, and that, 
therefore, migration represents a weak channel of change for the internal economic 
geography of the area. The relevance of the qualitative aspects of these flows, namely the 
skill composition of the flows, is often neglected. What are the skill composition and the 
geography of migration flows between European core and peripheral regions? Are peripheral 
regions experiencing a brain drain? In order to answer these important questions more 
research needs to be undertaken and more detailed data need to be publicly available in order 
to shed light on the migration behaviour of highly skilled individuals within Europe. The 
second step of my research journey moves in the direction of learning more about the micro- 
level migratory behaviour of talented individuals in the context of a peripheral region.
Human capital and migration, from theory to empirics: learning from a case study
The importance of human capital as a key source of value added, innovation and economic 
growth is widely acknowledged by both economists and policymakers. The relevance of
human capital in modem economies, and the divergence between its private and social return, 
justify public policy interventions aimed at subsidising human capital accumulation. The 
regional dimension is increasingly becoming central in this process of knowledge creation: 
local governments can directly affect individuals’ decision making by subsidising human 
capital formation.
In the light of my initial part of the research, the scope for policy might vanish if 
locally formed human capital is lost through migration. The public benefit of human capital 
investment does not always accrue where it is funded or where policy makers intended 
human capital to produce its positive effects.
The ability of a regional system to generate human capital is crucial, but it is not a 
sufficient condition for economic success. It is of considerable importance to maintain and 
attract highly skilled and educated individuals and migiation flows pose challenges to 
policymaking aimed at fostering human capital accumulation in peripheral regions. In the 
second part of my research, namely Chapter 2, the effort has been directed to shed light on 
the factors shaping the economic geography of human capital.
The focus of my analysis is on the micro-level location decisions of a sample of 
highly educated and skilled individuals residing in Basilicata, a small Italian Mezzogiorno 
region, who have benefited from a locally funded human-capital investment policy. The 
regional policymakers, in recognition of the importance of human capital as a key ingredient 
for regional growth, have given generous subsidies since the beginning of the 1990s to young 
graduates who want to attend a postgraduate course either inside or outside the region. The 
sample of individuals under analysis is far from being representative of the regional 
population, but the biased nature of the sample (highly skilled and educated individuals) 
makes the analysis a natural experiment for (i) studying the factors which affect the location 
decision of this important stratum of the population; and (ii) assessing the ability of the
regional system in a peripheral region not only to generate human capital, but also to retain 
it.
Tlirough a postal survey, I generated a dataset containing a rich set of individual-level 
information. The conduct of the survey and the design of the questionnaire employed are 
presented in detail in Chapter 4. I believe that a significant part of the value added of my 
analysis is associated with the richness of the data collected; a unique tool for studying the 
micro-level migration decisions of highly skilled individuals in a peripheral region.
By using micro-econometric techniques, I address the following questions:
1) Who are the migrants? Are there significant differences in the personal 
characteristics of migrants and non-migrants?
2) What are the main factors influencing migration?
3) Where do migrants go? Is the human capital attracted toward core regions? What 
are the regional characteristics that make a region attractive for highly educated 
and talented individuals?
The existing migration literature points out the likelihood that the highly skilled and 
well-educated are more likely to be mobile than the rest of the population. However few 
studies have explored the factors underlying individual migration decisions for this group. If 
policy makers are to capitalise on highly skilled and educated labour, regarded as one of the 
most important resources in modern economies, a first step has to be to understand why they 
migrate. This Imowledge can then be used in a strategic way to inform talent attraction and 
retention policies.
In my study, I am able to show that even within a quite homogeneous group of 
individuals, there are key differences which affect the chances of migration. In order to make 
a region attractive to talented individuals, strong economic performance and information on 
the availability of job opportunities are important pre-requisites, although they do not
necessarily guarantee success. Among the factors explaining individuals’ location decisions, 
quality of life is very important. For this reason, policy interventions aimed at improving 
quality of citizens’ lives should be regarded as key strategic objectives. A large degree of 
criminality significantly discourages the potential location decision of talented individuals 
and investors. Improving quality of life can lead to a substantial pay-off in terms of future 
growth and prosperity of peripheral regions.
Thanks to the quality of the data at my disposal, I am able to assess the importance of 
information and past migration experiences on an individual’s migration behaviour. The 
probability that an individual will select a given location increases the better the information 
available on job opportunities in that location. Lack of information, or indeed poor quality 
information on local economic opportunities, represents a market failure that can be at least 
partly corrected by policy measures. Actions aimed at this objective might therefore usefully 
be considered to be strategic in trying to retain and attract human capital.
My results have strong policy implications for the local economy under analysis. 
However, in my opinion, they also have a general validity for regions facing similar 
circumstances, such as many peripheral regions across Europe.
Migration networlcs and ethnic communities in cities
The migration literature argues that the stock of established migrants originating from the 
same location is almost always found to be an important explanatory variable of subsequent 
migration streams (see Greenwood, 1969). This finding suggests that mobility costs are 
endogenous and decreasing in the stock of migrants from the same source area. In my 
research, I find this result to hold even for a specific stratum of the population, i.e. highly 
skilled and educated individuals.
Why do established migrants from the same community affect mobility costs for 
subsequent incoming migrants? Established migrants often provide direct assistance to new 
migrants. They might help finance transportation costs, provide housing or pre-aiTange jobs. 
In addition, established migrants in the network supply information, which allows recipients 
to assess more carefully the expected returns from migi'ation. In my empirical study, 
described above, the role of information in individuals’ location decision proved to be a 
fundamental explanatory variable. This finding, which might seem obvious is, I believe, often 
discounted by economists interested in migration, and it has chamielled my research interests 
toward a new direction. Nelson ( 1959) has classified information on which potential migrants 
form their expectations into two main categories: specific and generalised information. 
Specific infoimation implies knowledge about particular opportunities, while generalised 
information concerns the awareness about the attractiveness of opportunities in a location. 
Established migrants have a fundamental role in conveying both types of information. In 
particular, by providing specific information and direct assistance they considerably reduce 
migration costs for incoming migrants.
The interplay between subsequent waves of migrants and the set of complex relations, 
which characterises this interplay, is in the literature often called migration network or 
migration chain. Taking into account the effect of migration networks implies a shift of the 
focus from migiation as individual optimising behaviour to migration as the result of mutual 
interdependence of a wider number of individuals.
I have always found fascinating the way migiants during the initial part of the last century 
selected their destinations. Migrants from neighbouring villages in the source country, choose 
completely distinct destinations, different urban areas, different destination countries, indeed, 
often different continents. Clearly, migrants belonging to source areas characterised by 
common underlying “push” factors were attracted to destination areas with distinct “pull”
factors. The clearest explanation of such a complex migration pattern is the existence of 
community level network externalities. Migration must be seen as a community-wide 
phenomenon rather than the independent decision of an individual taken in isolation.
Why is this different perspective about the migration dynamics important? The existence 
of a migration network and its mechanisms has a profound impact on the size and geography 
of migration flows. For instance, while a large set of potential destinations exists, migration is 
often channelled into only a very limited number of them. Migration flows originating from a 
given source area are often extremely spatially concentrated giving rise to the various Little 
Italys, Little Karachis or Chinatowns which characterise urban areas around the world.
I propose a theoretical model that explains both established migrants’ support for 
newcomers and the formation of ethnic communities on the basis of the existence of “ethnic 
consumption externalities” (Chapter 5). Incoming migrants from the same ethnic community 
have an expansionistic effect on the number of ethnic-specific non-tradable goods and 
services available to established immigrants in the host region. Culturally-based tastes for 
particular goods and services generate an ethnic consumer demand and only individuals from 
the same ethnic community have the skills or the “insider’s information” required to provide 
these goods (protected market). If the ethnic population is large enough, an ethnic sector will 
emerge and eventually grow as the population expands further. Migrant communities in 
almost every big city around the world provide a wide range of ethnic goods and services. 
Ethnic specific goods include for instance preparation of ethnic foods, banking and financial 
services, ethnic media such as magazines, radio, newspapers, religious services, organised 
unions, political groups and usually a vast array of migrant associations.
The main questions I address are the following:
1) When will established migrants provide support to newcomers?
2) What is the resulting size of an ethnic group?
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3) Is the resulting size equal to the optimal size?
4) When does an ethnic productive sector arise?
The model is able to produce a rich set of scenarios. In my opinion, the multiplicity of 
possible scenarios provides a plausible account of divergent migration experiences showed 
by different ethnic groups and in different episodes of human history.
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Chapter 2 
Migration of the Highly Skilled: An Economic Geography Model of the 
Brain Drain
Nicola D. Coniglio*
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1. Introduction
Migration of highly skilled individuals has assumed an increasing importance in recent 
decades reflecting the ongoing process of world market integration and the considerable 
reduction in costs of mobility? While some amount of mobility is beneficial not only to the 
recipient region but also to the source region if the latter is to integrate in the global economy 
(Saxenian et al. 2002; Rauch 1999), large outflows of skilled individuals might have a 
negative impact on the economic performance of the source region. This is known as the 
brain drain.
The issue of the brain drain has undergone a recent revival. The debate is fierce not 
only in developed countries where the brain drain has been historically severe but also among 
policymakers and economists in developed countries.^ The migration of highly skilled 
individuals raises concerns not only when flows take place between nations but also within 
regions in a country. The phenomenon of a brain drain within a country goes hand in hand 
with the phenomenon of agglomeration of economic activities into core regions and regional 
centralisation of human capital.^
Several studies have demonstrated that some groups of individuals are more 
geographically mobile and more reactive to regional wage differentials. In the migration
' Although restrictive immigration laws which cyclically emerge in many developed countries constitute 
important barriers to international labour mobility, it is a matter o f fact that the process o f globalization and the 
exponential reduction in the cost o f  acquiring information on distant locations have considerably reduced 
migration costs. This is particularly true for highly skilled individuals since a number o f developed countries 
have undertaken policies that facilitate and encourage admission o f  these workers.
 ^ Examples o f the relevance o f  the brain drain issue in developed countries are numerous. In Italy, for instance, 
the debate is both on the considerable flows o f highly skilled and educated from the South to the North o f  the 
country and on migration o f  talented individuals abroad (Becker et al.2003). The issue o f a brain drain from 
Canada to the US is well represented in the September 1999 issue o f Policy Option,
 ^ Chapter 3 o f the thesis studies the migration decision o f  talented individuals who benefited from a human 
capital investment policy adopted by an Italian Mezzogiorno region. The results show a clear process o f  regional 
centralization o f human capital which is a common feature in many European countries.
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literature the fact that economic migrants^ tend to be, on average, the more skilled, young, 
educated and entrepreneurial than similar individuals who choose to remain in their place of 
origin, is a standard proposition generally referred to as positive self-selection o f  the 
migrants.^ A better understanding of the pattern of migration is important for assessing the 
economic and sociological consequences for the origin and destination regions. The more 
migrants are favourably selected, the more beneficial will be their impact on the destination 
economy. On the contrary, the more positively selected are the migrants the greater, in 
general, will be the adverse effect in the origin region. Although the adverse effect of the 
brain drain on the source region is a common belief in the literature, we acknowledge that a 
recent strand of research maintains a more optimistic view in this regard. In a separate section 
of this work we will briefly present and discuss the “beneficial brain drain” hypothesis.
The economic geography framework offers useful insights to the analysis of the brain 
drain and its eonsequences. As pointed out by Commander et al. (2004) the strength of the 
economic geography explanation of the brain drain lies in its explicit general equilibrium 
nature which gives internal consistency to the analysis. Agglomeration of highly skilled 
workers in core regions is a consequence of economic integration and reduction of trade costs 
in the tradable sector. Spatial unevenness and centralisation of human capital in core 
locations might result even when regions have identical starting points.
In the basic model of Krugman (1991), the interaction between interregional labour 
migi'ation, scale economies, transport eosts and a spatially immobile source of demand 
generates agglomeration and dispersion forces. Since some factors of production are spatially 
mobile, when transport costs fall below a critical level, agglomerative forces become strong
 ^ We refer to economic migrants as individuals who move from one place o f work and residence to another, 
both within or across countries, on the basis o f a decision taken comparing their own economic opportunities in 
the origin and destination locations. In this way we want to distinguish those migrants from asylum seekers and 
those migrating because o f  others decisions (such as family reunification).
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enough to give rise to a core-periphery structure. Therefore, even if regions are a priori 
identical, they can endogenously differentiate into an industrial core and a de-industrialised 
periphery due to migration-induced demand linkages. The standard economic geography 
model cannot be directly applied to analyse the brain drain issue since the assumed 
homogeneity of the footloose factors of production implies that we inevitably ignore, by 
definition, the “brain” component (Commander et al. 2004).
In this paper, by introducing skill heterogeneity and localised human capital 
externalities into the Kiugman (1991) model we are able to re-interpret the basic core- 
periphery model as a brain drain model. Two types of manufacturing workers exist in our 
simplified economy: low and high-skilled, where skills are associated with the efficiency unit 
of labour offered in the labour market. We assume that a low-skilled worker is able to supply 
one unit of labour effort. High-skilled workers are potentially more productive than the 
unskilled ones. Interaction between high-skilled manufacturing workers in a region increases 
the productivity of each worker by means of a knowledge diffusion process (we assume that 
geographical proximity is needed). In the model the skill premium is endogenous and 
increasing in the regional share of high-skilled workers.^ Migration of the highly skilled is at 
the same time cause and consequence of the endogenous regional real wage differential.
The regional level of skills can be interpreted as the stock of human capital in the 
economy. According to Lucas (1988) the accumulation of human capital is the source of 
positive spillovers. It is reasonable to argue that workers' skills are augmented through 
learning and exchange of ideas, and that workers, therefore, increase their productivity by
 ^ For a review o f theoretical and empirical contributions on this topic see Chiswick (2000). Borjas, Bronars and 
Trejo (1992) find evidence o f self-selection studying internal migration in the U.S. In fact migrants with higher 
educational levels appear to be attracted toward regions with higher returns to edueation.
 ^ According to Glaeser (1998), firms choose to locate in cities and pay the higher wages and suffer congestion 
costs because workers in cities are more productive: "...if workers weren't more productive firms would leave 
cities altogether and hire elsewhere. Since the urban wage premium appears to be a centuries-old phenomenon, 
we must assume that over the long run, firms are quite willing to pay these higher wages".
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interacting with those around them. As a result, migration of a worker from a region where 
the average level of human capital is low to one where the average level is high will raise his 
productivity. Geographic proximity is crucial since it allows ideas to travel more rapidly; the 
impact of localised externalities weakens with distance. As proposed by Kremer (1993), 
many production processes consist of multiple tasks, all of which must be successfully 
completed for the product to have a full value. The matching of skilled workers in the 
production process increases the probability of successfully performing those tasks. In 
equilibrium skilled workers are clustered in the core region. This result is consistent with a 
series of stylised facts, the most significant being, the substantial wage and productivity 
differences between rich and poor regions.
Incentives for migration of highly skilled individuals and “its timing” depend on the 
process of goods market integration. When trade costs are high, a dispersed equilibrium with 
no incentive to migrate is a stable outcome, a result in common with the traditional core- 
periphery model. The initial phase of regional economic integration is characterised by a 
brain drain: highly skilled have stronger incentives to migrate and will compose the initial 
wave of migrants. If integration comes to a halt, a positive self-selection of the migrants (with 
all highly skilled in one region in our model) might be a stable equilibrium. Eventually, if 
regional economic integration proceeds further, low-skilled migrants might find it convenient 
to follow the same pattern. These will lead to a complete agglomeration of all footloose 
workers in the core region as in the Krugman model.
The results of the paper show the existence of a range of trade costs for which only 
high-skilled workers have an incentive to migrate. Therefore the benefit of introducing labour 
heterogeneity into the basic core-peripheiy model is to enable us to explain one of the most 
striking features of interregional migration patterns, the positive self-selection of the
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migrants. Another important implication of the model is the existence of a persistent wage 
and productivity differential between the core and peripheral regions, which is due to two 
main factors: sorting of highly skilled individuals in the core and localised human capital 
externalities associated with skilled density in the core. This prediction has been supported by 
a recent strand of empirical literature.
A recent work by Giannetti (2003) addresses the issue of positive self-selection of 
migrants and regional convergence using a different framework from the one used here. In an 
overlapping-generations model of a two-regions economy characterised by localised human 
capital externalities and skills heterogeneity, the author shows that an initial economic 
disadvantage (lower capital abundance) might give rise to a poverty trap since self-selection 
of migrants causes regional differences in total factor productivity and hampers convergence. 
Cost-of-living differentials, arising as a consequence of the Balassa-Samuelson effect, 
explain migration flows of low-skilled workers from the high-income to the low-income 
region. While we work on very related issues, our perspective is different since we want to 
investigate the effects of a process of regional economic integration on the spatial distribution 
of skills and regional convergence. In addition, as in almost all new economic geography 
papers, our point of departure is represented by two initially identical regions. No underlying 
differences are assumed.
Another related contribution is that of Mori and Turrini (2004). As in our contribution 
they use a new economic geography framework to study spatial clustering of individuals with 
heterogeneous skills. The mechanism and the main assumptions of their model greatly differ 
from our approach. In their modification of the Kr ugman (1991) core-periphery model, many 
heterogeneous worker-sellers offer goods which are both horizontally (variety) and vertically 
(quality) differentiated. The quality of a variety depends on the skill level of the workers who 
produce it. Free entry ensures that skilled workers reap all rents associated with their skills. A
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crucial assumption in their model is the existence of a fixed communication cost together 
with the traditional (proportional) iceberg trade costs. Communication costs imply that 
imported goods’ perceived quality is discounted by a fixed amount, irrespective of their true 
quality. In turn, skilled agents are proportionally less affected by distance compared with the 
less skilled. These non-convexies in the technology for selling goods to distant locations 
imply that the more skilled are relatively less dependent upon local markets. They have an 
incentive to move toward locations where other skilled workers reside since a wider range of 
high quality goods will be available (lower price index). Conversely, less skilled workers 
tend to cluster in a region where their local sales are abundant but where, at the same time, 
locally provided goods are of relatively low quality. Their model predicts an inevitable 
regional inequality since spatial sorting/skill segmentation is always a feature of stable 
equilibria. We base our model on a different premise, i.e. the existence of human capital 
externalities, and specifically investigate the effect of regional economic integration on 
spatial equilibria. Regional inequality and skill segmentation is not inevitable nor automatic 
in our model but depends on the degree of integration (proxied by the size of transport costs).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present recent empirical evidence on 
agglomeration and human capital externalities. Section 3 develops the model. In section 4 we 
examine the possible spatial equilibria and their features. In section 5, we briefly discuss a 
recent strand of research which advocates the idea of a beneficial brain drain. The last section 
concludes.
2. Agglomeration and Human Capital Externalities: empirical evidence
In our model, the interaction between high-skilled workers in a region increases the 
productivity of each worker by means of a knowledge diffusion process. Regions with a
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higher average level of human capital are therefore more attractive for high-skilled workers. 
The skill premium is endogenous and increasing in the regional share of high-skilled workers. 
In our model, therefore, migration flows of high-skilled individuals and the extent of human 
capital externalities are closely interrelated phenomena. One of the implications of the model 
is the existence of a wage and productivity differential between the core and peripheral 
regions.
Economic theory gives several explanations on why wages may be different across 
regions in the short run, one of the main reasons bemg the existence of asymmetrical regional 
shocks and, over time, divergences of regional business cycles. In the long mn, after the 
necessary adjustments in local labour markets have taken place, regional wages should, in 
principle, converge.
One possible explanation for the observed lack of convergence in the long run is 
linked to the existence of differences in the regional “endowment” of amenities. Local 
amenities, such as good climate, favorable physical morphology of the area, air and water 
quality, may affect regional wages thiough two main channels. First, through a positive (or 
negative) effect on consumer utility. For example if consumers value the warm and sunny 
weather of Southern Italy, they will require a wage premium to live and work in rainy and 
cloudy climate of Northern Italy. As a result, ceteris paribus, we expect workers of similar 
characteristics to be willing to accept lower salaries in regions with pleasant weather 
conditions. Secondly, local non-exclusive amenities may also have a direct influence on 
labour productivity. If the effect is positive we will expect higher wages. The attractiveness 
of the area, due to a positive regional wage differential, will induce migration, and therefore 
these productivity differences will be capitalised in land rents.
The impact of exogenous regional characteristics on the spatial variation in factor 
prices is generally evaluated using hedonic price estimation techniques (Roback 1982). As
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Hanson (2001) points out, although empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that local 
amenities contribute to explaining regional differences of factor prices, some evidence shows 
that considerable differences remain even within regions with a similar endowment of 
exogenous amenities.
Some theories, based on the existence o f localized human capital externalities, argue 
that differentials in factor remuneration may be persistent over time if regions have different 
levels of human capital (see Eaton and Eckstein 1997). The main idea is that the level of 
skills, education and experiences of the local labour force positively affect workers’ 
productivity. Interaction between skilled individual enables flows of ideas, diffusion of best 
practices and, in general, the possibility to benefit from a local knowledge stock. As a 
consequence, high-skilled workers from other areas will also be attracted toward regions with 
higher returns to skills. Therefore, a positive self-selection of migrants (see Borjas et al. 
1992) may generate a self-sustaining mechanism of growth. According to the theory the level 
of local human-capital has an important role in explaining spatial differences in wages and 
housing prices. Recent empirical studies have supported this prediction using micro data, 
Rauch (1993) employs US Census data on wages and human capital of individuals in 237 
cities in 1980 to estimate externalities in cities using individual wage-regressions. The notion 
of human capital defined by Rauch contains both education and work experience 
components. His results suggest that the external effect of a one-year increase in average 
schooling in cities has a positive and statistically significant effect on wages of workers in the 
same city of around 4%. These results hold even when he controls for the effects of other 
factors such as R&D investment policies that favour some cities, as well as university 
concentration in urban areas. More recently, Ciccone and Peri (2000) find that a one-year 
increase in average schooling in US cities raises aggregate productivity by 8 to 11%.^
For a survey on empirical work on human capital externalities in cities see Moretti (2004).
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How are externalities transmitted across regions? Is there any evidence that their 
effects are weaker over larger distances? Ciccone and Hail (1996) use data at the county level 
to see if variations in population density can explain the large discrepancies in productivity 
levels across US.^ In their analysis, they control for the endogeneity of employment density 
to ensure that the correlation between density and productivity that they find is not merely the 
result of productive regions growing faster than less productive ones. They find that doubling 
employment density increases labour productivity by 6%. Their results hold even when other 
factors are taken into account (such as the level of public capital, the level of education and 
the influence of market size). According to their analysis, closer interaction between workers 
in a geographical unit does have a positive effect on productivity. The elasticity of wage with 
respect to the local employment density in studies similar to Ciccone and Hall (1996) ranges 
between 4 and 8% (for a recent comprehensive survey see Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). 
These estimates of agglomeration economies might be considerably upward biased according 
to a study by Combes et al. (2004). A simple but important reason for spatial differences in 
wages is due to spatial differences in the composition of the workforce. Sorting of workers by 
skills across areas implies a different average wage. Combes et al. (2004) perform an 
empirical analysis on the determinants of wage disparities across French employment areas 
employing a large panel of French workers comprising 20 million observations between 1976 
and 1998. The authors are able to take into account, under the same framework, of the effects 
on wage disparities of: (i) geographical skill sorting; (ii) spatial differences in endowments; 
(iii) agglomeration externalities. Spatial sorting of skills accounts for most of the explained 
disparities in wages. Their results highlights the considerable importance of a positive self­
selection in migi’ation flows in explaining persistence in wage and income regional 
inequality. It is interesting to note that their findings do confirm the importance of
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agglomeration economies in densely populated areas.^ Skilled workers tend to cluster 
together in larger and denser locations; the skill composition effect magnifies the 
agglomeration effect on spatial wage disparity.
Indirect evidence supports the argument that the relevance of spatial influence decays 
as distance increases. In fact, the geographical distribution of income and unemployment both 
in absolute values and variations over time is strongly correlated across neighbouring regions 
(see Overman and Puga, 1999, and Quah, 1996).
J. The Model
We consider a world economy consisting of two regions (1,2). There are two sectors: 
agriculture and manufacturing. Agriculture is perfectly competitive and produces a 
homogeneous good employing interregionally immobile farm labourers (sector-specific 
factor). In our “brain-drain” model this reflects the fact that some individuals in the 
population are perfectly immobile.
Manufacturing is a monopolistically competitive sector producing a variety of 
differentiated products with increasing-return-to-scale technology and employs 
interregionally mobile workers. We assume the existence of two types of workers in the 
manufacturing sector, which differ only in terms of the level of efficiency unit of labour 
supplied. In what follows we define in details the building blocks of our model.
3.1 Consumers ’ behaviour
All individuals share the same Cobb-Douglas utility function:
® According to the authors, in the U.S. a worker in the most productive state is two-thirds more productive than a 
worker in the least productive state.
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( 1)
where M is a quantity index of consumption of manufactured goods and A is consumption of 
the agricultural good. Therefore ju is the expenditure share of manufactured goods. The 
manufacturing aggregate M, is a sub-utility function of a discrete number of varieties defined 
by a constant elasticity of substitution function:
M I
Mp <7-1
(2 )
where n is the number of varieties produeed, W/ is consumption of each variety and p  is a 
parameter representing the intensity of the “love for variety” in the manufacturing sector. The 
constant elasticity of substitution between any two varieties is cr = 1/ (1 - p), (cr>l).'
The consumers maximize (1) subject to the following budget constraint:
10
P^A + ^ m ,P i = Y
1
where Y  is income and Pa, Pi are respectively, the prices of the agricultural product and 
prices for each variety of the manufacturing aggregate.
A two-stage budgeting procedure can be applied. The first step in the consumer’s 
problem is to choose each m,- in order to minimise the cost of attaining a given M:
 ^ Their estimated elasticity o f  wages with respect to local employment density (which is around 2%) is 
considerably lower than those found in similar studies (from 4 to 8%).
Then number o f varieties produced, /?, is assumed to be large. The use o f  integer is formally correct and 
qualitatively equivalent to the use o f  a concept o f a continuum o f  goods. Later, in Chapter 5, it will be more
convenient to treat « as a continuous variable.
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min s.t. M  =
1
Solving the first-order conditions yields:
ffl; =
/  \~<yEl
kPj j
m.
and by substitution of this into the budget constraint we obtain:
1 -cr
M  = z
1
Pi m f a ~
[ P . i j
<7 -1
w hich  im plies:
El
p M (3)
Equation (3) is the compensated demand function for the jXh. variety, where P is the 
manufactured goods price index, a measure of the minimum cost of purchasing a unit of the 
composite index M:
P =
1
1-cr
(4)
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The second step of the consumer’s problem is to choose the optimal allocation of 
income between A and M  so that the utility is maximised. Maximising U = subject
to PM  + PaA=Y, gives us the uncompensated demand for A and for each variety, rrij :
^  = (5)
From the consumer’s utility maximisation problem we can also express the indirect utility 
function, substituting (5) and (6) into (1) yields:
the term P^P/~^^ can be interpreted as the regional cost-of-living index in the economy.
What is the welfare effect of an increase in the number of varieties? Assuming that all 
varieties are available at the same price we can rewrite the
manufacturing goods price index as:
P = "  1- 0 - = p,n
1l-cr
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Therefore, an increase in the number of available varieties reduces the manufacturing price 
index. Consequently, given that the indirect utility function (7), is decreasing in the 
manufacturing price index, the regional welfare increases as the number of varieties rises.
The elasticity of substitution between varieties, a , determines the responsiveness of the price 
index to a change in the available number of varieties.
3.2 Labour supply and human capital externalities
The world farmer’s population employed in the agriculture sector is 1 - p. Since farmers 
cannot regionally relocate, the supply in each region is (1 - p)l2.
The manufacturing sector employs two types of workers (i) low-skilled workers, and 
(ii) high-skilled workers. Both types of workers are endowed with one unit of labour, and 
may move between regions. We assume that the global population of workers of each type is 
normalised to 1. The total population of manufacturing workers therefore sums to 2.
The existence of localised human capital externalities implies that the interaction 
between high-skilled workers in a region increases the productivity of each skilled worker by 
a knowledge diffusion process. The productivity of high-skilled workers, i.e. the efficiency 
units of labour supplied, depends upon the number of workers with similar characteristics in 
the regional labour force. In the model the skill premium s^  is endogenous, and may differ
between regions according to the size of the regional highly skilled population s^  = /(5 ', ) , 
where Sj represents the regional high-skilled workers population. We formalise the positive 
interaction between high-skilled workers in a region as:
^ ,= 5 '/  (8)
‘ ‘ In this model, labour provided by low and high skilled is qualitatively homogeneous. Manufacturing workers 
o f the two types are perfect substitutes.
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where the parameter X measures the strength of human capital externalities. Such 
externalities are increasing in the quota of high-skilled workers but at a decreasing rate. 
Given d ' / dS^  = X(Si > 0 , and d " / dS  ^ = -  ï){Sj < 0, it follows that 0 < 2 < 1.
The fact that the high skilled are more efficient in providing unit of labour is reflected in the 
following relation between low/high skilled competitive wages in each location:
w.
where w' and , represent respectively the nominal wages of high-skilled and low-skilled 
workers in region /.
It is useful to distinguish between the world population of manufacturing workers and 
the world total supply of effective units of labour. The two measures are not identical since 
the geographical distribution of skilled workers (the human capital level in each region) 
affects the total number of units of labour supplied. Total units of effective labour in one 
region are given by:
( 10)
where U, and represent respectively the share of total low and high-skilled workers 
population, which live in region i
It is important to note that the number of skilled workers, as a fraction of the total 
manufacturing labour force, is exogenously determined.
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3.3 Production technology
Agriculture is a constant-return-to-scale, perfectly competitive sector. We normalise the 
unitary labour input requirement to 1. Agiicultural products are freely traded and therefore 
agricultural prices and wages are equalised across regions and shall be our numeraire. 
Consequently, - w ^ = \  in both regions.
The production of any variety of the manufactured good involves a fixed cost and a 
constant marginal cost:
/, = <2 + J3Xj (11)
where x^  is the quantity produced and /,• the labour requirement for its production. Because of 
economies o f scale at firm level and consumers’ preferences for variety, each firm produces a 
differentiated product facing an elasticity of demand equal to cr.
Imported manufacturing varieties incur Samuelson’s iceberg trade costs. If a variety is 
shipped from one region to the other, part of each unit is assumed to “melt away” during the 
transport, therefore only a fraction 1/x arrives at destination.^^ The introduction of this kind 
of trade costs implies that, if a variety is produced in region 1, consumers in the two different 
regions have to pay different prices. A manufacturing good produced in region 1 costs the 
F.O.B. pricep, for a home consumer, while the consumers in region 2 pay the C.I.F. ( tp^
As a consequence, according to the number of varieties produced in each region, the 
manufacturing price index P  may assume different values between regions:
In subsequent research, we consider the worker’s human capital investment decision and the role o f  public 
policy.
r  >  1 represents the amount o f the good dispatched per unit received at destination.
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1
l - c rP^= n,pP +nAP2T)
(12)
Pi = +^ iP2
3.4 Size o f  the regional manufacturing industry
Production teclinology is the same for each variety in both locations. Manufacturing labour is 
the only input. We continue to assume perfect substitutability in the production function 
between low-skilled and high-skilled labour inputs. A firm producing a specific variety at 
region /, faces a wage rate W/ for each effective unit of labour, which consequently represents 
the low-skilled nominal wage.
Given the following profit equation:
=PiX^~- [avpx^)w^  ( 13)
the profit-maximising price of a firm located in region i is a constant mark-up over the 
regional wage rate:
(14)
Relative prices of varieties produced in regions 1 and 2 must then be:
F.O.B. and C.I.F. are commercial clauses frequently used in international transaction meaning respectively 
Free On Board  and Cost Insurance and Freight.
In this way we are able to preserve the features o f  Dixit-Stiglitz framework (in particular, the number of 
varieties being proportional to the regional labour force, and the scale of each firm invariant to the skilled vs. 
unskilled labour ratio).
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Free entry drives profit to zero, and the optimal output level is the same for each firm in any 
region:
(.«)
the associated equilibrium labour input is also constant and given by substituting (16) into 
( 1 1 ):
l j = a a  (17)
Full employment of the labour force allows us to determine the number of manufacturing 
varieties in equilibrium^*^:
« , = 4  = —  (18)a a
An increase in the regional size works through changes in the variety of goods (firms) 
available, leaving unaltered both the mark-up over marginal cost and the scale of individual 
production. The equilibrium number of firms is therefore proportional to the region’s
Since each variety is produced in one location by a single firm, «, represents both the number o f varieties and 
the number o f firms in region i.
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effective population of workers. The relative number of varieties produced in the two regions 
therefore reflects their relative shares of effeetive labour.
A (19)
3.5 Equilibrium conditions in goods and labour markets
In equilibrium the optimal output for any firm should be equal to the demand for its product 
in both regions:
X\  — p
X2 — P
Px
p: +
(æ E vn -(o - - l)  2V G  y
(P2W°
- ( c r - 1 ) ■z
^  y  - c r  APi+ p —(c r -1 )  2v G  y
(20)
After some manipulation, using the pricing rule equation (14), we obtain the 
following expression for the nominal wages at which each firm breaks even:
viy
cr-1
acT
or —I
a<j
^ [Y .p r '
j [ Y ,P p t '- ‘’ ^Y^P^'’-')
(2 1 )
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We choose the following normalisation'^ in order to simplify the wage equation and 
the manufacturing price index:
c r - l
cr (22)
a  = — a
From the pricing rule equation (14) we get: = w- and from equation (18) p  = f  .
It is possible to rewrite the price index as:
Z l—fT , Y I —<7 IjWi + Z 2W 2 (p
1\-(j
1
1-C 7
(23)
and the wage equation as:
1 (24 )
, (7-1
where (f) — f  ^ -  i j ^  (remember cr > 1 ). The parameter ^ which is a function of the hade 
costs can be interpreted as a parameter reflecting freeness of trade, ranging between zero for 
very high trade costs when r  00 (autarky), and one in the case of no trade costs, i.e. r  = 1.
The scope o f  these normalisations, widely used in this literature, is to shift the analysis to the number o f  
manufacturing workers and their wages in each region in order to study the equilibria in the model and its 
stability properties.
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The price index equations (23) as noted before have an important property. The regional 
manufacturing price index will tend to be lower, the higher is the share of effective 
manufacturing labour in the region, since more varieties are produced locally without 
incurring therefore any transport costs (price-index effect).
The total regional income Yj is given by the sum of all farmers and workers wages:
Yy — vfjL, + (1 — //) / 2 (25)Yj = ^2^2 + (1 — /./) / 2
where 1-p is the world population of immobile farmers.
Real wages are obtained by deflating nominal wages by the regional cost-of-living index 
P f  We assume that workers are paid linearly according to their level of skill su
consequently the real wages, ( co]‘, respectively for low- and high-skilled workers) are:
® i"=;pr
' (26)
p>‘ (27)
2 P /
The economy is assumed to reach instantaneously a short-run equilibrium for any given 
allocation of workers between regions. The solution of the set of equations (23)-(25)
As the agricultural product is the numeraire.
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determines W \  and W 2 for which: (i) consumers maximise utility; (ii) profits are both 
maximised and driven to zero by free entry; and (iii) all markets clear.
Having defined the structure and main building blocks of the model, we now move to an 
analysis of the migration behaviour and the resulting spatial structure of the economy.
4, Migration Flows and Spatial Equilibria
In the long run, in the absence of migration costs, real wage differentials are the only 
determinant in the decision of low and high-skilled workers to move from one region to the 
other. The regional share of both types of workers adjusts according to the real wage 
difference:
Ûi - ^ 2 ) = z ( ^ “)
^ i = z ( ^ i  ~(^D^Z(<^'' ') (28)
z ' > o
where % is a function increasing in û/ ‘ and a/, which represent the regional real wage 
differentials for low- and high-skilled workers. Regional migration flows to region 1 are 
positive if workers enjoy a higher level of utility (i.e. higher real wages) by moving in this 
region.
We would like to determine when the long run equilibrium will exhibit regional 
convergence (yielding a symmetric equilibrium), and when it will lead to a core-periphery 
structure with all manufacturing workers and the manufacturing sector concentrated in one 
region. In addition, we are interested in determining whether in the long run the migration 
pattern will exhibit the feature of a positive self-selection of the migrants. To answer these 
questions we have to consider the local stability of these equilibria. Let us consider the case
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where the world economy is at the symmetric equilibrium. It is easy to see that if  labour 
allocation between regions is identical, that is ri", = 5'^  = [/, = = 1 / 2, the nominal wages are
the same in the two regions, W]=W2 . The same equality holds for real wages. Assume now 
that as a consequence of a shock to the symmetric equilibrium T, > , that is some workers
are allocated from region 2 to region 1. If this change in stocks positively affects real wage in 
region 1 relative to region 2, it will encourage migration, as the initial symmetric equilibrium 
is unstable. The opposite is true if the real wage differential becomes negative.
The initial movement of a single worker has four effects.
The first is the price-index effect, working in favour of divergence. As mentioned 
above, the cost of living will be lower in the countiy with the larger manufacturing sector, 
because a consumer who wants to purchase a certain bundle of manufactured goods will incur 
in less trade costs.
A second agglomerative force, the home-market effect, reinforces this effect. From
(24), nominal wages in a region will tend to be higher if income in the region is high. The 
reason is that firms can afford to pay higher wages if they have good access to a larger 
market. As a consequence, the large market retains a more than proportional share of 
manufacturing sector.^*^
Third is the competition effect. The presence of more firms in the local market will 
increase competition to serve the regionally immobile consumers, thus tending to reduce 
local profits and consequently equilibrium wages. This negative effect on regional wages 
encourages the stability of the symmetric equilibrium.
This adjustment mechanism assumes that entry and exit o f  firms occurs infinitely faster than migration. Firms 
are therefore always in equilibrium.
The idea is not a new one but finds its root in the literature on market potential (see Harris, 1954).
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Finally, the migration of a skilled worker has a positive effect on the productivity of 
skilled workers in the host region, and therefore a positive effect on their nominal wages. We 
call this last effect which is peculiar to high-skilled workers migration, skill premium effect.
The stability of the symmetric equilibrium is given by the relative strength of these 
agglomerative and dispersive forces at work. For sufficiently high trade costs, imported 
manufactured varieties are so expensive that it is profitable to have a symmetric equilibrium. 
Conversely, at low trade costs the symmetric equilibrium is always unstable. Regional 
economic integration has no impact on workers’ incentive to re-locate until a critical level of 
freeness of trade is reached. When this threshold of freeness of trade, the (fbreak, is reached 
the symmetric outcome becomes unstable since workers have an incentive to migrate. The 
skill-premium effect is peculiar to high-skilled workers, therefore the incentive to migrate and 
the relative (^break will be higher for this type of workers.
Formally a stable equilibrium is any point where:
(i) the regional wage differentials are zero and dco" / dU.,do)’' / dS.,da)''’' IdS^,dco''' / dU, 
are all strictly negative. This is the case of a stable symmetric equilibrium where 
Sf = U. = l /2; \ / i  e{ \ ,2} .  A positive increase in the share of low or high-skilled workers in
the region, negatively affects the real wage differential. Agglomerative forces are dominated 
by dispersive forces. Therefore, as a consequence, a counter-migration of manufacturing 
workers will re-equilibrate the size of the regional manufacturing labour force;
(ii) co" > 0,0)' > 0 and = [/,. = 1 (or vice versa co" < 0,co' < 0 and S, -  f/, -  0 ), in the
case of a core-periphery equilibrium. The entire population of low and high-skilled workers 
will be concentrated in the core. In this case we have the condition that in the core region 
do)“ / dUf, do"  / dSf, dco' / dS^, do?' / dUj are all strictly positive;
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(iii) œ" = 0 ,A)' > 0  with 5',= 1 and when a positive self-selection equilibrium is a
stable outcome. In this case high-skilled workers will be concentrated in the core region, 
while an equilibrium without complete concentration is still stable for the unskilled workers 
( dco" / dUj,dcof' / riiS, should both be strictly negative).
In figures 1 and 2^' we plot, respectively, the low and high-skilled workers’ real 
wages differentials at different levels of trade costs. This allows us to analyse how the 
integration process, measured by the level of trade costs, will affect the equilibrium size of 
the manufacturing sector and the average level of human capital in the regions. We report the 
real wage differential for low and high-skilled workers as a function of the share of only one 
type of manufacturing labour keeping the other at the symmetric equilibrium. In this way we 
assess, for each type of worker, how the real wage differential reacts as a consequence of 
variations in the populations of both types of manufacturing worker. Specifically, diagrams 
(a) [(b)] of both figures report the real wage differentials as a function of the share of low- 
skilled [high-skilled] workers in region 1, given that high-skilled [low-skilled] workers are 
equally distributed between the two regions, S  = 112 [ t / - l / 2 ] .
For high trade costs {(j) = 0.05, or r=  2.714) the symmetric equilibrium is stable since
the cost of supplying a market by exporting is too large. Both low and high-skilled have no 
incentive to migiate in region 2. When a worker migrates (either high or low-skilled), the 
host region becomes less attractive than the source one. In the long run the economy 
converges to a symmetric equilibrium in which manufacturing is equally divided.
The model cannot be solved analytically. In the paper, all the figures presented are derived by numerical 
simulations. The values o f the parameters are similar to those used in related papers. We let p  = 0.3, while cr = 
4; mark-up estimates are normally between 20-30%, which correspond to an elasticity o f  substitution a  between 
6 and 4. Agglomerative externalities are chosen on the basis o f the empirical evidence mentioned in section 2 of  
this chapter, X = 0.1. Analytical expressions for f  f  break and <j> self-selection, have been derived using a 
procedure first introduced by Puga (1999). Maple files containing the simulation procedure and the stability 
analysis are available on request.
Since the two regions are perfectly symmetric we restrict the following analysis to region 1.
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As the economy becomes slightly more integrated {(j) = 0.07, or r = 2.487), the
symmetric equilibrium is no longer stable for both types of workers. Consider the low-skilled 
first. From figure 1 it is evident that an increase in the share of both low and high-skilled 
workers has a negative effect on the real wage differential (the schedule is downward-sloping 
for both U and S). The competition effect is in this case stronger than the effect of the other 
two agglomerative forces. For the high-skilled worker the situation is different (figure 2). If 
the skilled manufacturing labour force concentrates in one region, these workers become 
more productive and the competition effect is more than compensated by the skill premium 
effect. However, migration of the low-skilled has a negative impact on the high-skilled real 
wage.
Finally, at low trade costs (^  = 0.60, or r  = 1.1856), the symmetric equilibrium 
becomes unstable and a core-periphery structure arises.
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Low-skilled workers real wage differential: effects of low and high-skilled migrants at
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Fig. 2
High-skilled workers real wage differential: effects of low and high-skilled migrants at
different level of trade costs
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Figure 3 shows how the types of equilibria are related to trade costs. The shares of 
manufacturing labour force in region / ,  U and 5', are measured on the vertical axis. Solid and 
dotted lines represent respectively stable and unstable equilibria. At high trade costs, there is 
a unique stable equilibrium in which skilled and unskilled workers are equally divided 
between the two regions.
When trade barriers fall below a critieal level ((Jf sustain) a core-periphery 
equilibrium for the high-skilled becomes possible. However, the symmetric equilibrium is 
still stable for values above another critical value (t/f breaK)P As the regional economies 
become more integrated high-skilled workers will migrate first in response to real wage 
differentials.
Is there a range of transport eosts for which only the high-skilled migrate in the eore 
region? We compute a critical level of trade costs for which U ^  \ and 5* = 1 (or zero) is a 
stable equilibrium, (jhself selection. For trade costs below this level a core-periphery 
equilibrium as in Krugman (1991) is the only stable outcome. The stability of the symmetric 
equilibrium for the low-skilled is affected by high-skilled workers’ migration. When 
dispersion forees are still strong (i.e. for high and intermediate level of trade costs) the 
concentration of high-skilled workers in the core region will push down the low-skilled real 
wage in the core and therefore cause an outflow of low-skilled from this region until wages 
are equalized.^"^ For sufficiently high trade costs, this equilibrium characterized by highly- 
skilled concentration in the core and a more than proportional share of low-skilled in the 
periphery may still be stable. But as regional integration proceeds, the stability may be 
reversed. A two-stage migration process may arise. First, the core region (whieh is still
For values o f trade costs within the range break < ()' < /  sustain), both concentration o f the high skilled in 
one o f the two regions and symmetry are possible equilibria. The model does not predict which equilibria will 
arise; policy and history have clearly a potential role in determining the outcome.
This means that once the highly-skilled find it profitable to migrate into the core region a symmetric 
equilibrium is not sustainable for the low-skilled. This out-migration o f low-skilled from the core, often 
observed in booming urban areas, will reinforce the regional skill differential.
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relatively small) is attractive only to skilled and talented individuals. Concentration of skilled 
workers increases productivity and firms are willing to pay higher nominal wages. A brain 
drain from the periphery will take place which is both cause and consequence of regional 
wage disparities. Average wages between the core and the periphery will differ for two main 
reasons: (i) higher average skills due to sorting of highly skilled in the core; (ii) higher 
productivity due to localised human capital externalities. Second, as a threshold of trade costs 
is reached, (!>-self selection, high-skilled workers’ concentration in the core region also 
induces low-skilled workers to migrate leaving the periphery de-industrialised (the home- 
market and price-index effects become stronger than the competition effect).
U=1
0
S=1
Fig. 3
Trade costs and stability of the spatial equilibria
Self-selective migration
TRADE UBERAUZATION  
Tdecreases
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From figure 3 the following relations are evident:
break < ^  self-selection < f  sustain < f  break < ^  sustain
there exist, therefore, a range of trade costs for which a self-selecting equilibrium is possible 
self-selection < (j> < ^  sustain) and another smaller range for which it is the only stable 
equilibrium (ÿ)" sustain < (p < (ff break).
The critical values considered depend on the parameters of the model. All the threshold 
values are increasing in j l l  If the share of manufactures in the economy is large, the 
agglomerative forces will be stronger for two reasons. First, the manufactured products will 
have a bigger share in the bundle of consumption of a representative individual so the price- 
index effect becomes more important. Second, the share of manufactures in world income 
will be larger and therefore strengthens the home market effect.
Critical values are decreasing in a; the elasticity of substitution in demand. The range of 
trade costs in which the core-periphery equilibrium occurs is greater the smaller is the 
elasticity of substitution between varieties. Lower a  implies that consumers view different 
varieties as being more distinctive, increasing their love of variety. The result is an 
equilibrium with more varieties and a lower output of each. By decreasing cr, the magnitude 
of scale economies, one of the agglomerative forces in the model is reduced. Finally an 
increase in the strength of the positive externalities between high-skilled worker, À , makes 
agglomeration possible at higher level of trade costs.
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5. A note on the Beneficial Brain Drain Hypothesis
A  considerable and persistent out-migration of highly skilled individuals has long been 
thought to be one of the major cause of poor countries/regions remaining poor. Contrary to 
this widespread belief, a small literature that emphasises a possible positive effect of the brain 
drain has emerged. The key idea of this strand of research is that, compared to a closed 
economy, an economy open to the prospect of migration differs not only in the opportunity 
faced by workers but also in the structure of incentives they face. Higher prospective returns 
from human capital in the potential destination positively affect the human capital formation 
decision at home. A positive probability of getting a job abroad might alters individuals’ 
incentives to acquire human capital such that the source economy will end up having an 
average level of human capital higher than when the probability of migration is zero. This 
finding is conditional on the fact that not all the individuals succeed in obtaining employment 
abroad. Stark (2004), for instanee, argues that a controlled and restrictive policy can be 
welfare increasing and might push the economy toward the socially optimal investment in 
human capital.^^
The first paper that formalises the effects of migration on levels of education in the 
source country is Mountford (1997). The author analyses the interaction between income 
distribution, human capital accumulation and migration. He shows that when educational 
decisions are endogenous and migration is not a certainty, a brain drain can benefit the 
sending economy by increasing the proportion of educated people in the economy. Under
This result is not possible in a closed economy where individuals under-invest in human capital formation 
since they do not take into account the social returns from it.
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certain conditions'^, the negative effects due to the migration leakage can be outweighed by 
the increase in human capital formation.
Along the same line Stark et al. (1997) compare the human capital formation and 
depletion in an economy open to out-migration to that of a closed economy. As in Mountford 
(1997) the possibility to migi*ate gives an incentive to acquire human capital at home. The 
brain gain is ensured not by a strictly positive (and random) probability of successful 
migiation as in the Mountford’s model but by imperfect information of employers in the 
destination country on the skills of the migrants and the presence of return migration 
(imperfect screening). Heterogeneous individuals (which they label skilled high-skill workers 
and skilled low-skilled workers) faced with the opportunity to migrate invest in human 
capital at home and leave the country. Employers in the destination country will initially pay 
all workers the same wage based on the average productivity. In the subsequent period, 
employers learn about the true ability of migrants and are able to wage discriminate. The 
wage adjustment induces the relatively low-skill workers to return in the source country. 
Under certain conditions the post-return average level of human capital is higher than that of 
a closed e c o n o m y . I n  Stark et al. (1998), a strictly positive probability of migration raises 
the level of human capital by providing the incentives to invest in education and might 
therefore result in a brain gain. They use a model in which agents live for two periods. In the 
first period they split their time between work and education. Work is remunerated by 
competitive wages per efficiency unit of labour and the cost of acquiring education is equal to 
the foregone earnings. Investments in human capital increase the efficiency level of labour in 
the second period. Higher prospective returns from human capital in the foreign country
These conditions are a low probability o f migration, high returns per efficiency unit o f labour in the world 
economy relative to the home economy and a low proportion o f  educated people in the pre-migration 
equilibrium.
In this model the brain gain is more likely to occur: (I) the larger the share o f low-skilled workers in the 
occupation; (2) the steeper the wage schedule with respect to skill in the destination country; and (3) the flatter 
the wage schedule with respect to skill in the source country.
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affect the education decisions made at home. The authors argue that while some workers will 
leave the country, other workers who have invested in human capital do not succeed in 
migration and stay home with more human capital than they would have formed in the 
absence of the possibility of migration.
How likely is this theoretical possibility of a beneficial brain diain for the source 
country/region? We have reason to believe that, despite its appeal, the likelihood of a 
beneficial brain drain is rather low. Firstly, the hypothesis of a beneficial brain drain is 
crucially dependent on a positive and random probability of not being able to migrate. In the 
context of internal migration in developed countries this optimistic result is more remote 
since immigmtion law plays no role. Secondly, the probability of migiating largely depends 
upon immigration policy in the destination country. In general, immigration policies are 
designed to give preference to a particular target of migrants. These policies vary a lot across 
countries and over time. The choice of immigration policy affects the characteristics of the 
migrants the country will receive, therefore, individuals in the origin country having these 
targeted characteristics are more likely to migrate.
A simple example will show that a beneficial brain drain is only a special case of a 
more general framework which deserves further investigation. Many developed countries are 
experiencing a shortage of low-skilled or skilled manual workers, and their immigration 
policies are specifically tailored to meet these needs. Individuals will look at the different 
probability of successful migration across skill profiles and make their human capital 
investment decision accordingly. Let us suppose we have two countries in the world: Norway 
and Vietnam. Norway experiences a labour shortage in its fish industry and therefore the 
government tailors migration policy accordingly. If you are a Vietnamese fisherman you have
The only immigration policy which satisfies the assumption o f  these models, to our knowledge, is the so 
called Diversity Visa Lottery in the US. Only a small fraction o f  all visas issued in the US is granted through 
this lottery mechanisms (55 thousands per year) and by contacts o f the author with the US Department o f States
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a probability of migration jp^=0.6,  while for any other skill profile the Norwegian
government is more restrictive p'" = 0.2. In Vietnam, you might either become an engineer
with a training cost ^ = 0.5 and earn =2 or remain an unskilled fisherman and earn
= \ .  In Norway fishermen are paid W,,j- -  3 while engineers = 4. Given this setting, it
is possible to build a simple payoff matrix and analyse human capital formation choice in 
Vietnam with and without migration.
Table 1 - Payoff matrix: skill formation and location
Skill Engineer Fisherman
Location
Vietnam JV^,^  —k = 2 — 0.5 = \.5
Norway P'^  Wyf =
0 .2 » 4 + 0 .8 * 2 -0 .5  = 1.9 0.6*3 + 0.4*l = 2.2
With no possibility of migi'ation, to become an engineer is a dominant strategy for a 
Vietnamese. When there is a positive possibility of migration, the selective Norwegian 
migration policy might affect the structure of incentives in a perverse way, reducing human 
capital formation in Vietnam. Clearly this example is too simplistic, nevertheless it gives 
some insights and stresses the importance of immigration policy in the destination country, a 
policy variable out of the control of LDCs.
it seems evident that a considerable share o f the applicants is constitute by illegal migrants or temporary 
migrants already settled in the US.
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6. Concluding remarks
Modern economies have assisted an epochal transition from a world where the basic source 
of value, productivity and economic growth has been physical labour and manual skill, to a 
world of knowledge-intensive capitalism where a fundamental role is played by intelligence 
and intellectual labour (human capital). Scientists, engineers and high skilled workers on the 
factory floor and in advanced services companies are the sources of innovations and ideas. 
The wealth o f regions and nations in the 21®^ century economies is largely based on this 
human infrastructure (Florida, 1995). Consequently, a region with a more skilled labour force 
is likely to grow faster than a region with a less skilled labour force.
Technical progress and reduced barriers to the movement of goods and services have 
a fundamental impact on the incentive for factor of production to spatially relocate. As 
emphasised by brain di'ain literature, migration of high skilled workers may potentially have 
consequences on the regional economic performance, since it affects the way region maintain 
and sustain human resources.
This paper uses a version of the core-periphery model of trade and location by 
Krugman (1991) to analyse the migration behaviour of workers with different skills in a 
process of regional economic integration. In our model, the interaction between high-skilled 
workers in a region increases the productivity of each worker by means of a knowledge 
diffusion process. Regions with a higher average level of human capital are therefore more 
attractive for high-skilled workers. The skill premium is endogenous and increasing in the 
regional quota of high-skilled workers.
We find that there exists therefore a range of trade costs for which a self-selecting 
equilibrium is possible and another smaller range for which is the only stable equilibrium. 
One of the results of the model is the existence of a persistent wage and productivity
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differential between the core and peripheral regions. Recent empirical works have supported 
this prediction using micro data.
Although in our model migration of highly skilled individual has an impact on low- 
skilled footloose workers through agglomeration and dispersion forces, in order to keep the 
analysis simple, we abstract from direct spillovers or complementarities between high- and 
low-skilled workers in the productive process. A possible extension of the current framework 
would be that of explicitly taking into account complementarities between high- and low- 
skilled workers. In addition, the inclusion of congestion costs associated with agglomeration 
as in Helpman (1997), or of location preferences which translates into an imperfectly mobile 
labour force as in Ludema and Wooton (1997), would at the same time add more realism to 
the migratory behaviour and prevent the model from having an unrealistic catastrophic 
agglomeration at low transport costs.
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1. Introduction
The importance of human capital as a key source of value added, innovation and economic 
growth is widely acknowledged by both economists and policymakers. In his seminal paper 
“Reflections on Investment in Man”, Schultz (1962) underlines the importance of 
improvements in the quality of human capital as one o f the major factors explaining 
economic growth. The abilities of individuals, “the economic capabilities of man”, are 
considered as '‘'produced means o f  production and except for some pure rent (in earnings) for 
differences in inherited abilities, most of the differences in earnings are a consequence of 
differences in the amounts that have been invested in people” (Schultz, 1962, p.l). The 
abilities of individuals are, therefore, the product of individual investments in education and 
job-training activities.
The relevance of human capital in modern economies, and the divergence between its 
private and social return, justifies public policy inteiwentions aimed at subsidising human 
capital accumulation.* The regional dimension is increasingly becoming central in this 
process of knowledge creation: local governments can directly affect individuals’ decision 
making by subsidising human capital formation. However, as Justman and Thisse (1997) 
have pointed out, the public benefits of human capital investment “do not always accrue 
where it is funded”. The scope for policy might vanish if locally formed human capital is lost 
through migration, as emphasised in the brain drain literature. Positive se lf selection is a 
stylised fact in the migiation literature, i.e. more talented and skilled individuals have an 
higher propensity to migi'ate than the rest of the population. This can result in migration 
widening the regional wage and income gap and lowering the standard of living in the
' Educational expenditure is considered a key component o f national investment with a substantial pay-off in 
terms o f output growth. The current state o f  thinking about this issue is well summarized by Temple (2001), 
who, after surveying the relevant micro- and macroeconomic evidence, concludes that “the weight o f the 
evidence points to significant productivity effects o f  educational investment”.
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peripheral location, as the new economic geography literature emphasises (Krugman, 1991; 
Coniglio, 2003). Regional integration of labour markets may increase workers’ incentive to 
spatially relocate, in particular from peripheral to central regions. This is explained by the 
action of agglomeration forces; human capital migrates from where it is scarce to where it is 
abundant, rather than vice versa (Lucas, 1988).
In the present study, we emphasise the importance of these considerations through the 
analysis of a case study. We investigate the location decision of a sample of highly educated 
and skilled individuals residing in Basilicata, a small peripheral Italian Mezzogiomo region, 
who have benefited from a locally funded human capital investment policy. The regional 
policymakers, in recognition of the importance of human capital as a key ingredient for 
regional gi'owth, have given generous subsidies since the beginning of the 1990s to young 
graduates who want to attend postgraduate courses either inside or outside the region.
The sample of individuals under analysis is far from being representative of the 
regional population, but the biased nature of the sample (highly skilled and educated 
individuals) makes the analysis a natural experiment for assessing the ability of the regional 
system in a peripheral region not only to generate human capital but also to maintain it.
The focus of the paper is on the micro-level migratory behaviour. In particular, we 
want to shed light on the following questions:
1) Who are the migrants? We want to investigate whether there is a significant 
difference in the personal characteristics of migrants and non-migrants.
2) What are the main factors influencing migration?
3) Where do migiants go? Is human capital attracted toward core regions? What are 
the regional characteristics that make a region attractive for highly educated and 
talented individuals?
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The data set used in this analysis has been generated tlirough a postal survey designed 
and conducted by the author. The survey questionnaire was sent to all the individuals who 
benefited from the local policy measure during the period 1991 to 2001. For each individual, 
we collected data on background, experience and outcome of higher education, opinion on 
the quality of the course attended, job-search strategy after the course, and space-time career 
details from first to current employment status. The high quality of the data and the extremely 
high rate of response (around 70%) makes the data set at our disposal a unique tool for 
studying the micro-level migration decision of highly skilled individuals in a peripheral 
region.^
The empirical analysis aimed at addressing the above-mentioned questions consists of 
two main parts. In the first part, we investigate the personal characteristics explaining the 
propensity whether or not to migrate. This analysis exploits maximum likelihood estimation 
with a logit model. We are able to study different propensities to migrate within a particularly 
interesting stratum of the population, young and highly educated individuals. Prior insights 
from migration literature tell us that this sub-gioup of the population is highly mobile, but to 
our knowledge there are no in-depth studies focused on their micro-level migration decision. 
We find that, even in this homogeneous sample, individuals show a different migration 
propensity on the basis of their personal characteristics. The probability to migrate decreases 
with age and there is a positive self-selection in migration flows: even among a group of 
highly educated individuals, the probability to move is higher for the most talented. 
Individuals with different educational backgrounds have a different propensity to migrate: an 
individual with a bachelor’s degree (or master’s degree) in business studies or engineering is 
less likely to stay home than other gi'aduates. An important finding of our analysis is that 
individuals who studied outside the area of origin (that is individuals with a previous
Detailed descriptions o f  the survey methodology, the questionnaire design and o f  sample selection issues are
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migration experience) are more likely to migrate. It is worth noticing for its policy 
implications, that, attendance at a post-graduate course, or getting an internship, at home 
significantly increases the probability of retaining the highly skilled worker. We find also that 
the effect of the personal unemployment status on the propensity to migrate is negative, that 
is, unemployed individuals are mainly located in the home region. This gives support to the 
“contracted” view of migration, i.e. individuals migrate with “a job in their hands”. 
Moreover, people born in urban areas are less likely to migrate compared to those born in 
small towns.
While in the first part of the analysis we investigate the personal characteristics which 
make an individual more or less likely to migi’ate, in the second part we analyse an important 
complementary issue, namely the characteristics which make a region attractive to highly 
skilled individuals. In the second part of the paper we jointly analyse the decision to migrate 
and the choice of the location of migration, i.e. we investigate the spatial structure of the 
human capital generated tlirough the policy intervention. We use a conditional logit model in 
order to investigate where highly educated and skilled individuals do go. The use of a 
conditional logit model for the study of individual migration decision has considerable 
advantages, since it enables the researcher to take into account the opportunities that 
individuals face in a set of potential alternatives. In the present study, each Italian region is 
considered as a potential destination (including Basilicata). Individuals choose the location 
which offers the higher level of utility on the basis of regional and personal characteristics.
Knowledge of the factors influencing highly skilled individuals’ location decisions is 
fundamental to national and local policymakers who wish to capitalise on this important 
source of economic development. We study the decision made by both movers and non­
movers. Thanks to the availability of very detailed information on individuals’ characteristics
reported in chapter 4 o f this thesis.
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and past experience, we are able to assess the relative importance of some variables like 
distance and the individual’s previous migiation experience in a way that is generally not 
possible due to data limitations.
We find a strong evidence for the importance of spatial variables, such as physical 
distance, past migration flows from the origin region and direct knowledge of potential 
destinations due to previous migration experiences, in explaining the pattern of subsequent 
geographical mobility. Lack or poor quality o f information on local economic opportunities 
represents a market failure that can be, at least partly, corrected by adequate policy measures. 
Action aimed at this purpose might also be considered as strategic in trying to maintain and 
attract human capital. Moreover, non-economic aspects are important in influencing high- 
educated individuals’ location choice. Local policy aimed at improving quality of life should 
be regarded as an important policy instrument along with more traditional interventions.
Our analysis explores the factors affecting the location decision of highly educated 
individuals in an economy presenting all the features of a core-periphery structure.^ Our 
results have strong policy implications for the local economy under analysis. However, in our 
opinion, they also have a general validity for regions facing similar circumstances, such as 
many peripheral regions across Europe.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we describe in more detail the 
regional policy implemented, the conduct of the survey and the sample under analysis. In 
section 3, the logit model is presented and the results are discussed. The conditional logit 
analysis is presented in section 4. Finally, section 5 contains our concluding remarks on the 
paper.
 ^ O f course, as with all case studies, it is necessary to exercise caution when generalising the findings to other 
situations. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue that the behaviour o f the highly educated and skilled 
individuals in our sample is not substantively different from that o f similar individuals in peripheral regions o f  
many developed countries.
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2, Conduct o f the survey and description o f  the data
The data used for the empirical analysis are derived from a postal survey of individuals who 
have received financial support from Regione Basilicata for attending a postgraduate course 
in a Higher Educational Institution/ The survey was designed and conducted by the authors 
with the collaboration of Regione Basilicata. The survey questionnaire aims at directly asking 
people about their decision whether or not to move and the main factors influencing their 
decision.^ For each individual, we have collected data on background, experience and 
outcome of higher education; opinion on the quality of the course attended; job-search 
strategy after the course; and space-time career details from first to current employment 
status. The survey was conducted during May-July 2002. The questionnaire was sent to all 
the individuals who benefited from the local policy measure between 1991 (the first year in 
which this measure was implemented) and 2001, which amounts to slightly more than one 
thousand individuals.^ A total of 740 individuals returned the questionnaire, approximately 
70% of the total. After deleting observations relating to incomplete questionnaires, the final 
sample contains 700 observations.
The individuals in our sample have a bachelor’s degree and were resident in Basilicata 
at the time when they applied to receive funding.^ The number of migrants at the time of the 
survey was 411 (58% of the total). It is worth noting that Basilicata, like the rest of the Italian 
Mezzogiomo, has been a traditional source of migrants for both other Italian regions and 
foreign destinations. The propensity to out-migrate toward other Italian regions as measured
 ^ Postgraduate courses were held in Basilicata or outside (also abroad). In what follows we use interchangeably 
the words postgraduate course and master’s degree for identifying the human capital investment experience 
financed by the regional authority.
 ^ In what follows we investigate individuals’ migration decisions during the period 1991-2002.
 ^ In order to increase participation, individuals received a follow-up request letter and subsequently were 
contacted by phone.
’ There is a small group o f  people (35 individuals) whose highest qualification at the time o f application was a 
high school diploma.
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by the ratio between the (gross) number of people changing their registered place of residence 
and the total regional population (multiplied by 1.000), is considerably higher than the Italian 
average. In 1997, this index of migration was 8.4 for the overall Basilicata population against 
5.3 for the Italian regional average and 7.2 for the Italian Mezzogiomo (ISTAT, Italy’s 
National Institute of Statistics).
Naturally, we should expect that young individuals from Basilicata have a higher 
propensity to migrate. ISTAT’s data reveals that in 1997, of the cohort of 5,137 individuals 
aged 25-29 in Basilicata, 990 changed their residence to other Italian regions. For this cohort 
the migration index, as defined above, was 22.6 for male and 18.7 for female (the Italian 
average was 11.1 for males and 9.9 for females).^
3. Who are the migrants?
3.1. Empirical Methodology
A  first step of the empirical analysis is related to the discrete binary choice of an individual 
whether to remain in the region of origin or move to another location. The econometric 
analysis of this study is based on the micro-level decision-making of a potential migrant. 
Formally the level of utility enjoyed by an individual i at the present location (h) is:
~  P h ' ( 1 )
Note that in our sample the average age is 27.5 with a standard deviation o f around 2.5 years.
60
where is a vector o f independent variables and (3  the associated coefficients measuring 
the relative importance of these variables. This vector includes personal characteristics such 
as age, sex, education and variables reflecting regional characteristics of the origin area.
If the individual migrates to another location (/) the level of utility she will enjoy is 
given by:
(2)
The opportunities and costs and, therefore, the associated level of utility which the individual 
will face are a function of personal characteristics and regional characteristics of the 
destination area. In the balance between these two levels of utility the effects of intervening 
obstacles should be taken into account. Costs of migration are a function of individual 
characteristics and existing barriers:^
C M lj-^a 'x^+ s^  (3)
An individual remains in the current location if the benefits from migration Ul -  C/J are 
smaller than the associated cost CM,]}. :
j3 ' x  +  £
 ^ Barriers to labour mobility and migration can be o f  different nature. Factors such as for example geographical 
distance, uncertainty linked to a lack o f infonnation, a different environment, legal barriers, are all important 
and might be perceived in a different way by heterogeneous individuals.
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where is an unobservable variable representing the net benefit from remaining in the 
current location. The observed binary individual choice reveals only if the net benefit is 
positive or negative, but not the underlying unobservable utilities. Our observation will be:
/T -  1 i f / / * > 0  
77= 0 if 77* <0
On the basis of the outlined random choice approach, it is possible to examine the probability 
that an individual with a given set of attributes will make the choice of staying in the cunent 
location (77 = 1) or migiating (77 = 0):
Prob [ i ï  = 1 1a:] = Prob [ u l  -  U} + CMÿ > o] 
= Prob^/J'Ar + f  > 0 |a ]
We assume that the disturbance s  has a logistic distribution with mean 0 and variance 
1. This assumption will lead to a logit model.
3.2. Description o f the data and variables influencing migration
The dependent variable HOM E  is a dummy that equals 1 if the individual resides in 
Basilicata at the time when she received the questionnaire and 0 otherwise. We look at 
individuals’ current locations.*'
Logit and probit models are widely used in econometric applications. The difference between the two models 
is based on the particular probability distribution function adopted. While the former uses a logistic distribution 
function the latter is based on a cumulative normal one. The two distributions are similar except for the heavier 
tails o f the logistic distribution. On theoretical grounds it is difficult to justify the choice o f  one instead o f  the 
other, since it makes very little difference in terms o f substantive results.
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The essence of our approach is to determine the characteristics that differentiate the 
two groups of individuals and to evaluate the impact of some individual characteristics on the 
propensity to migrate.
The explanatory variables used in the econometric model are defined in table 1. The 
set of variables include (z) individual characteristics such as age, sex, city of origin and 
employment status {ii) detailed information on educational background (marks obtained, 
subject of study, location of university and master studies, eventual internship period after the 
master, etc.) {Hi) information on geographical preferences in the job-market search after 
completion of the postgraduate course.
The literature on migration has shown that among the factors which contribute to the 
decision to migrate a relevant role is played by personal characteristics (sex, age, etc.) and a 
number of life-cycle considerations (marriage, completion of schooling, entry into the labour 
force, etc.).
Several studies have shown that the peak migration propensity occurs in the early 
twenties and declines steadily thereafter (Ledent, 1990; Otomo, 1990; Vergoossen, 1990; 
Long, 1992; Plane, 1993). We investigate the relationship between age and migration 
propensity by using the variables age and age squared}^ Age of each individual is measured 
at the moment when the bachelor’s degree was completed. In our specification this variable 
should be interpreted as a qualitative measure of personal abilities rather than being aimed at 
capturing life cycle effects. The expected sign for age is positive since younger individuals 
are those who completed the university studies in a shorter time span, i.e. the most talented 
individuals.
" In section 4, we estimate a conditional logit model to examine the location decisions o f  these individuals at 
completion o f their master studies. In that section we discuss the motivations which lead us to investigate 
individuals’ location decisions in two different points in time.
Age squared is included to test whether there is a non-linear effect of age on the dependent variable.
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The relationship between education and migration propensity has been widely studied 
in empirical works. High educational attainments are generally employed as a proxy for 
individual abilities. Since more talented and able individuals have both lower costs and 
higher returns from migiation, education is positively associated with migration probability 
(Ghatak et a l, 1996; Antolin and Bover, 1997; Ritsila and Ovaskainen, 2001). This implies 
that migrants tend to be favourably “self-selected” for labour market success (Borjas, 1987; 
Boijas et a l, 1992a,b). On the basis of these characteristics, individuals in our sample should 
be considered as highly mobile. We want to test if, even within this sample, variation in these 
personal characteristics matters in explaining whether individuals are likely to stay or move. 
In our study we employ a more direct measure of educational attainment, i.e. the final mark 
of the bachelor’s degree {mark).
The expected effect of gender on the propensity to migrate is ambiguous. 
Traditionally male individuals have been found to be more likely to migrate, but, as stated in 
Ghatak et a l (1996), several studies have shown that this is no longer typical.
The effect of the size of the place of origin on the propensity to migrate is not well 
documented in the literature. Is there any significant difference in the propensity to migrate 
between individuals born in larger urban areas compared to those born in rural areas or small 
towns? The variable city allows us to test for significant differences between people born in a 
city and those born in smaller t o w n s . W e  expected that this variable would have a positive 
sign, since the cost of migration for individuals born in a city is higher than for residents in 
smaller centres, which have stronger push factors for young and highly educated individuals.
Beyond these factors, we want to check if individuals with different educational 
backgrounds might have a different propensity to migrate {business, engineering and law).
Individuals born in a city are those born in Matera or Potenza, which are the two main urban agglomerations 
in Basilicata.
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For example, an engineer and a lawyer might face a considerably different spatial distribution 
of job-market opportunities.
Individuals’ past migration experience during the period of investment in human 
capital is essential for understanding subsequent patterns of geographical location. If an 
individual has lived in a location different from home during her university or master studies, 
she is more likely to migrate for two main reasons. First, these experiences enable the 
building of personal connections (with friends, potential employers, etc.), which reduce the 
information costs of finding employment opportunities. Moreover, knowledge of the local 
environment reduces the costs of adapting to new environments. “The [...] repeat migrant [...] 
have substantial first-hand knowledge about locations where he lived before, and [...] he may 
be able to recoup some part of any location-specific capital he acquired there” (DaVanzo, 
1983). Second, individuals who have already moved once could have lower costs associated 
with a second move; for example in term of psychic costs, since original family ties and the 
like have already been broken (Farber, 1978 and Herzog and Schlottmami, 1981).'"^ We test 
for the relevance of these considerations by means of two dummy variables: university away 
and master away. According to our hypothesis we expected a negative signs for all 
thesevariables.
Since an internship was for some individuals an integral part of the master course 
financed, we include a dummy variable internship (equalling 1 if the individual did an 
internship and 0 otherwise) to investigate whether this individual experience might explain 
part of the propensity to migrate. In addition, we consider the effects of doing an internship 
at home adopting a dummy variable which is equal to 1 when the master course was held at 
home and 0 otherwise. In this case the sign of the estimated coefficient should be positive.
Molle and van Mourik (1989) found that the psychic costs significantly reduce migrations within Europe.
In this study the Universities o f Salerno and Bari are considered as “home” locations. This is justified on the 
basis o f strong economic and social connections between the provinces o f Matera and Bari, on one side, and 
between the provinces o f Potenza and Salerno, on the other side. Moreover, Salerno and Bari are close, 
respectively, to Potenza and Matera and well connected. We also have to consider that University o f Basilicata 
does not have a long tradition, so the Universities o f  Bari and Salerno attract many students from Matera and 
Potenza.
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Table 1 -  Probability of staying in the home region: description of the explanatory 
variables used in the logit model
Variable Description Expected sign 
of effect
M ean Std.
dev.
M ale 1 =inale  
0 = female
+ / - 0.44 0.49
City 1 -  born in city 
0 = born in a small town
+ 0.57 0.49
Age Age at the time o f attending the postgraduate 
course
27.47 2.75
Age squared Age, as defined above, squared + / - 117.28 63.83
M ark Final mark o f the bachelor’s degree (between 66 
and 110)
- 102.7 8.17
Business 1 = degree in business studies 
0 = other
+ / - 0.36 0.48
Engineering 1 -  degree in engineering or architecture 
0 = other
+ / - 0.09 .028
Law 1 = degree in law 
0 = other
+ / - 0.31 0.46
University away 1 = undergraduate studies attended outisde the 
home region 
0 = other
0.48 0.50
M aster away 1 = Master course attended outside the home 
region 
0 = other
0.75 0.43
Internship 1 = individual obtained and completed an 
internship 
0 — other
0.79 0.41
Internship at home 1 = internship at “home” (in Basilicata or in the 
provinces o f Bari and Salerno)
0 = other
+ 0.15 0.36
l\o_pref_H O M E 1 = Basilicata is not the preferred location 
0 = other
- 0.64 0.48
Unemployed 1 = currently unemployed (at the moment o f the 
survey)
0 = other
+ / - 0.15 0.36
High mobility 1 = individual changed its jobs more than 3 
times between the first and the current 
employment position 
0 = other
0.11 0.31
M asteryear The year when master course has been attended + / - 7.53 2.21
Highschool 1 = individual’s highest degree is highschool 
diploma
0 = bachelor’s degree
+ 0.05 0.22
Age*Highschool Variable capturing the interaction effect between 
age and highschool
- 0.35 1.76
Age squared* 
Highschool
Variable capturing the interaction effect between 
age squared  and highschool
+ 3.22 19.81
M ark*Highsehool Variable capturing the interaction effect between 
m ark  and highschool
- 4.06 17.95
66
In the questionnaire we asked individuals about the spatial structure of the job-search 
after completion of the master course. One of the items concerned individuals’ spatial- 
preferences. The variable no_j)ref_HOME captures, ceteris paribus, the effect of a lack of 
personal attachment to the origin region. Obviously, we expected a negative sign for the 
coefficient of this variable. Implicitly, the baseline model would include individuals with a 
strong attachment towards Basilicata.
Another personal characteristic we deal with is unemployment s t a t us . The  expected 
sign of the coefficient associated with this variable the literature is controversial. According 
to the “contracted” migration view, the sign should be positive, that is unemployed 
individuals should mainly be located in the home region since individuals migrate with a “job 
in their hands”. Opposed to this view is the idea of “speculative” migration, which sees 
individual migration as pail of the job-search strategy. As pointed out by Herzog et al. (1993) 
in their survey of the empirical literature concerning the complex interrelationships among 
personal unemployment, migration and the likelihood of re-employment, the availability of 
microdata is essential to study the relationship between unemployment status and migration.
The variable high mobility measures the number of individual’s job changes. We 
expect a negative sign, since individuals who change job frequently should be also more 
spatially mobile.
Since we are investigating migration decisions along a ten-year time span, it is 
necessary to control for different propensities to migrate due to changes in economic 
conditions in the alternative destinations. For this reason we introduce the variable 
masteryear as a control variable.
Unemployment might affect mobility at three levels: (I) personal unemployment; (2) regional unemployment 
differentials; (3) national unemployment rates. Here we analyse only the effect o f personal unemployment, since 
we are studying the personal characteristics explaining the propensity to migrate. In order to consider the effect 
of the regional unemployment differentials, we included the regional unemployment rates in the conditional 
logit we estimate in the section 4.
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In addition, we include three interaction effects which relate to the small number of 
individual in our sample whose highest degree obtained is an highschool diploma 
(age*highschool, age squared*highschool and mark^highschoot). These control variables 
are necessary since these individuals benefited from the policy at a younger age than the rest 
of the sample and their final mark is expressed in a different scale which we converted to the 
scale of the bachelor’s degree final mark.
3.3. Discussion o f the empirical results
Table 2 reports the results of the econometric analysis. Most of the coefficients are 
statistically significant and have the expected signs. Since the estimated parameters of a 
binary regiession model do not provide directly useful information for understanding the 
relationship between the independent variable and the outcome, in the last column the 
marginal effects are reported. * ^
We find evidence of differences in the migration behaviour between male and female 
individuals. In our analysis male individuals are more likely to stay home, more precisely the 
difference in the probability of staying home, evaluated at the baseline gi'oup, is 9.2%. This is 
an interesting result, even because the probability to migiate for the female population in 
Basilicata, in the cohort aged 25-29, is lower than that for male individuals in the same 
cohort. This finding points out that for female individuals the propensity to move increases 
relatively more than males if  they are highly educated.
People born in urban areas are 8.5% less likely to migi*ate. This outcome can be 
probably explained by the fact that larger cities are characterised by a critical mass of
The baseline group is defined as an individual with the following characteristics: a female; born in a urban 
area; with a bachelor’s degree other than economics, law or engineering; attending undergraduate studies at 
home and master studies in a different locality; internship not at home; with expressed preferences for the home
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amenities, therefore, the push factors are smaller as compared to towns/^ In addition, densely 
populated areas can offer more job opportunities. Individuals from small centres are likely to 
move anyway for job reasons; hence, for these sub-groups the substitutability between a 
home or outside location is higher.
The probability of remaining in the home region increases with age. We find support 
for a non-linear effect of this variable. Since age is measured at the moment when the 
bachelor’s degree was completed, in addition to the life cycle considerations which link age 
and migration propensity, this variable might also be interpreted as a qualitative measure of 
personal abilities. The positive sign of the estimated coefficient confirms that there is a 
positive self-selection in migration flows. Even among a group of highly educated 
individuals, the probability of moving is higher for most talented.
Further support for the existence of a positive self-selection of these migrants is given 
by the high significance of the variable mark. Individuals with a high final mark of the 
bachelor’s degree are less likely to stay home. An individual with the lowest mark is 36% 
more likely to stay at home than an individual with the top mark.
Individuals with different educational background have a different propensity to 
migiate. Among the variables which describe the subject of the university courses attended, 
we find that business and engineering are significant. The negative signs are probably 
justified by the fact that the “pull” factors for individuals with a degree in engineering and 
business are higher because some of these individuals are going to be employed in sectors 
like R&D, banking, etc, which are typically under-represented in peripheral, as opposed to 
core, regions. Individuals with a first degree in business studies and engineering are 18.4% 
and 21%, respectively, less likely to stay home than other graduates. This outcome has strong
location and currently employed. All continuous variables are specified at the mean value. The probability o f  
staying at home for the baseline individual is 0.477.
For instance, larger cities offer a wider selection o f  restaurants, cinemas and in general a wider set of 
consumption possibilities compared to small towns,
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policy implications: if policymakers give priority to financing human capital formation in 
subjects that are more closely connected with the needs of the regional economy this should 
increase the probability of maintaining the human capital generated.
In our analysis the most important factors are those related to the location in which 
people attended university, studied for their postgraduate qualification and obtained an 
internship. Our hypothesis is that individuals who attended their studies outside the area of 
origin are more likely to migrate. This is explained by the fact that individuals with previous 
migration experience in a given destination acquire information on the local labour market at 
lower costs through a series of sources (interpersonal communications with friends, potential 
employers, local communication media etc.). In addition, non-monetary and psychological 
costs of migiation will be lowered by an increased familiarity with the local enviromnent. 
The estimation results support our hypothesis. Master away and internship at home both 
have a strong marginal effect. Undertaking a postgraduate course outside the region reduces 
the probability of remaining in the home region hy 21.8%. In figure 1, we plot the effect on 
the predicted probability of staying at home of a change in the final mark of the bachelor’s 
degree for individuals who attended the postgiaduate course inside or outside Basilicata. The 
effect of this variable is rather strong.
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Figure 1. Predicted  probabilities: the effect o f  mark for 
ind ividuals w h o  a tten d ed  a m aster  at h om e or aw ay
1,00
0,90
1  0,70
Ë 0,602Û. 0,50 
I  0,40 
I  0,30 
0,20 
0,10 
0,00
60,00 70,00 80,00 90,00 100,00 110,00 120,00
-♦—M aster home 
M aster away
f ina l  m a r k
The coefficient of the variable internship at home captures the effect on the 
probability to stay o f an internship in the “home” location. Note that the dummy variable 
internship is significant and has a negative estimated coefficient. This outcome confirms our 
previous hypothesis: undertaking an internship increases the probabilities that an individual 
will remain in that location. Improving the connections with local economic agents by 
integrating higher education courses with internships in local enterprises and institutions 
would improve significantly the ability o f retaining human capital. In fact, an internship at 
home increases the probability o f staying by 7.3%.
The variable no_j)ref_HOME, as was expected, has a strong impact (a marginal effect 
of 22.5%) and is very significant.
The effect o f personal unemployment on the propensity to stay home is positive. That 
is, unemployed individuals are mainly located in the home region. This outcome is in line 
with the “contracted” migration view, which predicts that individuals migrate with a “job in 
their hands”. It is interesting to compare this finding with the results o f other studies using
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m ic ro d a ta .In  contrast to our results they find that unemployed individuals are more likely 
to move than the employed.^^ Our results could be explained by the presence of family 
networks that work like a social security system. Moreover, if we interpret the unemployment 
status as a proxy for low individual abilities, another explanation could be given by the 
presence of a process of positive self-selection among the individuals of our sample.
Our analysis confirms the hypothesis that the more dynamic individuals in the labour 
market are also the more spatially mobile {high mobility). These people are 15.6% less likely 
to remain in Basilicata.^ ^ The relationship between residential movement probabilities and 
job changing has been analysed also in Molho (1987), who obtains different results. Molho’s 
study uses a microdata set and is devoted to the analysis of males aged between 16 and 24 in 
Great Britain. It shows that residential moves are less common amongst those changing 
occupation. However, the results become similar, when it considers only the individuals 
changing occupation and improving their “job position”.
See, for example, DaVanzo, 1978; and Herzog and Schlottmann, 1984, whose geographical focus is on the 
United States, and Molho, 1987; Hughes and McCormick, 1989; Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1989 and Antolin 
and Bover, 1997 for Europe.
Some studies have shown that the positive effect o f  personal unemployment on the propensity to migrate 
becomes lower the larger the unemployment insurance given (Antolin and Bover, 1997) and the more lasting is 
the unemployment (McHone and Rungelin, 1993).
Caution should be given to the interpretation o f this variable. The causality might actually work in the 
opposite direction; people residing in Basilicata could be less dynamic as a consequence o f  local labour market 
conditions. We need to further investigate this aspect.
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Table 2 -  Probability of staying in the home region: logit regression results
Dependent variable: HOME Coeff. Marginal effect
Male" 0.372*(0.22)
0.092*
(0.05)
City 0.348*(0.21)
0.085*
(0.05)
Mark -0.036**
(0.02)
-0.009**
(0.004)
Age 0.466**
(0.21)
0.114**
(0.05)
Age squared -0.020**
(0.01)
-0.005**
(0.002)
Business" -0.788**(0.29)
-0.184**
(0.07)
Engineering" -0.923**(0.43)
-0.211**
(0.09)
Law" -0.233(0.29)
-0.057
(0.07)
University away" -0.326(0.22)
-0.080
(0.05)
Master away" -0.917**(0.29)
-0.218**
(0.06)
Internship" -0.694**(0.26)
-0.169**
(0.06)
internship at home 1.030** (0.32)
0.242**
(0.07)
No„pref„HOME° -0.997**(0.21)
-0.225**
(0.05)
Highmob" -0.655*(0.34)
-0.156**
(0.07)
Unemployed" 3.614**(0.46)
0.494**
(0.07)
Masteryear -0.225**
(0.05)
-0.056**
(0.01)
Age*Highschool -1.538**
(0.56)
-0.384**
(0.14)
Age squared* 
Highschool
0.113**
(0.04)
0.028**
(0.01)
Mark*Highschool 0.033
(0.02)
0.008
(0.005)
Constant 4.177*
(2.28)
N. Observations 700
LL -317.822
Pseudo R2 0.330
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%
° Marginal effects for dummy variables are calculated as discrete change 
from 0 to 1
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The probability of migration is increasing along the time span we are considering 
{masteryear). This finding is in line with the pattern of internal migration in Italy. Aggregate 
statistics show that, during the last five years, the number of people who migrated from the 
South to the North of Italy has increased considerably.
4, Wh ere do m igran ts go ?
4.1. Empirical Methodology
In section 3 we considered the individual migration decision in a binary framework, “move” 
versus “non-move”. This approach allowed us to investigate the underlying differences 
between these two sub-gi'oups of individuals, i.e. which individuals are more likely to migrate 
(or conversely to “stay home”). In this section we aim to provide a more in depth 
investigation of the regional characteristics affecting individuals’ specific location decisions. 
The following analysis considers each individual’s choice among the 20 Italian regions 
(including the home location).
The choice of the appropriate econometric methodology depends on assumptions 
regarding the decision-making process in terms of individual’s migration. If migration is a 
sequential decision-making process, individuals will first make the decision whether or not to 
move and then (for the movers only) decide in which destination to relocate. Those 
behavioural assumptions underline the necessity to use a model which treats the decision to 
migrate separately from the choice between potential destinations. The natural candidate is a 
nested logit model or alternatively a model focusing on choice within a set of potential 
destinations only for the movers.
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In a recent study, Davies, Greenwood and Li (2001) have argued that the decision to 
move and that of the destination choice cannot be considered as separated. Individuals jointly 
decide whether and where to move. We believe that this behavioural assumption is closer to 
reality. Methodologically this assumption on individual behaviour leads to a conditional logit 
model.^^
The empirical model representing the migration decision might be derived from 
individual utility-maximising behaviour in the framework of a random utility model. Utility 
of an individual i at location j  is given by:
U^ j = /5'X + e^ j (6)
where W is a vector of observable attributes pertaining to the potential destination regions 
and is a conforming vector of utility coefficients, which might vary depending on 
characteristics of the decision-maker, and e.j'm a random disturbance. McFadden (1974)
demonstrates that if the random disturbances in equation (6) are independent and identically 
distributed with the Weibull distribution, then the probability that an individual i will choose 
location j  is given by:
^  ~K (7)Z/c=l
The conditional logit model can only identify choice-specific attributes (which might vary across individuals) 
but not individual-specific attributes or origin-specific attributes. Nevertheless, individual characteristics might 
be incorporated using interaction terms and a fixed-effect (a dummy variable equal to one if the potential 
alternative is the home region) can be used to capture non-observable factors explaining a greater attachment to 
the origin region.
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where K  is the number of alternative locations.^^
Individual i chooses location /  when U^ j is the maximum among the set K  of potential
destinations. The probability of locating in a particular region depends on its economic 
attractiveness but also on amenities and quality of life that the region is able to offer 
compared to other competing destinations.
In our analysis each individual i is paired with values of the independent variables 
(regional characteristics) relative to the year of completion of the course, '^^ This approach has 
two positive effects. Firstly, the independent variables reflect regional characteristics at the 
moment when job-search activities were taken. Given the time span of our data, regional 
economic opportunities might have changed overtime. Secondly, we increase the variation in 
the independent variables, which is an advantage in the estimation of the conditional logit 
model.
Generally, the interpretation of the coefficients in logit models is not straightfbi-ward. 
One way of making this interpretation easier, in particular to assess their magnitude, is to 
express coefficients as average probability elasticities. As in Friedman et a l (1992), regional 
characteristics for each year are normalised to the national mean. Due to the noimalisation, 
the mean of the independent variables is equal to unity, and the estimated coefficients have a 
convenient elasticity-like interpretation. The elasticity of the probability that an individual 
will choose region k with respect to an explanatory variable x,. can be calculated by 
differentiating equation (7):
dP Y
We have performed tests for the independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (HA). The parameter estimates 
appear stable when we exclude sets o f alternatives from the choice set.
 ^ Due to lack o f data this approach is not possible for a limited number o f independent variables. In these cases 
we use the figures relative to the closest year available.
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where is the probability of selecting location ;, is the Mh variable of the vector A, and 
is the relative estimated coefficient.
If we sum across all individuals {i) and potential destinations (j) we obtain the 
relationship between average probability elasticity and the coefficient estimates, J3 :
f  = = (9)/V  JX
Since K  the potential number of locations in our study is 20, elasticity can be easily obtained 
by multiplying the estimated J3 by 0.95. For the average region a one-percent increase in the 
values of independent variable x^ , relative to the national mean (which is one) will cause a 
* (0.95) percent change in the estimated probability.
Normalisation has further advantages, it allows us (i) to remove the national growth 
trend for the independent variables over the period considered; (ii) to take into account the 
uneven pattern of gi'owth across Italian regions; and (iii) to use similar scale for the 
independent variables used in the estimation and, therefore, to reduce computational 
problems.
4.2. Description o f the data and variables influencing migration
The data on individual migration decision are derived from the postal survey as described in 
section 2. The conditional logit analysis is performed on migration data for 603 highly 
educated individuals that have benefited from the regional policy previously discussed. The 
sample under analysis is slightly different from the one used for the binomial logit, since we
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exclude individuals who have yet to find employment and those who have migrated to a 
foreign destination. Another difference with respect to the logit model is given by the fact 
that in this section we perform a conditional logit analysis which relates to the individual 
migration decision at the moment of the first employment following the completion of the 
postgraduate course financed by the regional authority.^^ This enables us to analyse, across 
individuals, a relatively homogeneous episode of personal decision making. Further 
relocations after the first employment can be influenced by a wide array of different reasons 
that it is difficult to control. However, it is notable that the difference in the spatial 
distribution of those individuals between the first and current employment is relatively small.
Figure 2 illustrates the regional distribution of the human capital “generated” by the 
local policy measure. Only 27.4% of these individuals are employed in Basilicata after the 
human capital investment period. A considerable share of individuals in the sample choose to 
work in Lombardia (mainly in the area of Milano) and Lazio. In this section we aim at a more 
in-depth investigation on the regional characteristics affecting individuals’ location decision. 
For each individual in the sample, the data include 20 rows (one for each potential location).
The dependent variable CHOICE is equal to 1 for the region where the first job after 
the course was obtained and zero otherwise.
We have decided to keep out o f the sample individuals who have yet to find employment since they are 
mainly located in the home region. We leave out individuals who have selected a foreign destination due to 
practical difficulties in finding comparable destination specific data for the empirical modelling.
® The results discussed in section 3 looked at current employment (that is employment at the time when the 
survey was conducted).
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Figure 2- The geography of the human capital generated; first employment
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The explanatory variables used for the conditional logit are reported in table 3.
The variables thought to influence the migration decision include those reflecting economic 
conditions and quality of life along with some measures of individual migiation costs 
associated with the potential destinations (based on the availability of information and the 
non-monetary psychological costs of moving).
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As a measure of potential economic gains (or losses) from migration, we include in 
the model the regional income per unit o f  labour. A positive sign is expected for the 
coefficient on this variable, which means that individuals are attracted by locations with 
relatively higher income per unit of labour.
The regional unemployment rate is also used as a relative measure of job 
opportunities in a potential destination. We expect a negative sign on this variable since 
higher unemployment areas should deter immigration.
We use the GDP per capita growth rate in the 3 years preceding the end of the master 
course {regional growth) in order to test whether individuals are attracted toward regions 
outperforming the national growth trend. This variable is aimed at capturing the recent 
dynamics of the regional economy rather than the static aspect of economic success, which 
should be captured by the two measures described above. We also expect this variable to 
have a positive sign.
Of particular interest are those variables reflecting relative quality of life in potential 
destinations. Florida (2002) argues that location-specific characteristics such as lifestyle 
options, amenities and quality of life in general have an important function as catalyst for 
attracting and retaining talented individuals in U.S. cities. In a recent contribution Glaeser et 
at. (2000) conclude: “if cities are to remain strong, they must attract workers on the basis of 
quality of life as well as on the basis of higher wages”. In our analysis we measure the impact 
of a set of quality of life variables on the probability that a certain region is selected by the 
individuals of our sample.
The variable culture represents expenditure per capita for fine arts and musical 
performances. This measure is a good proxy for demand, and therefore availability, of 
cultural amenities and is expected to positively influence the probability of migration to areas 
with a relatively higher value for this variable. We investigate also the effects of crime on the
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migration decision by employing two variables. Crimel is the percentage of micro-crime 
offences out o f the total number of declared offences.^^ These kinds of micro-offences are 
supposed to have a high impact on the day-by-day quality of citizens’ life. Higher values 
relative to the national average are expected to have negative influence on migration. While 
this variable captures the “qualitative” aspects of criminal activity, it is not a good measure 
for its quantitative aspects. In this respect we use crimel, which measure the number of 
violent episodes of crime per 10,000 inhabitants.
In addition, we use an index of population concentration: population density. 
Unfortunately this variable is available only for year 1999, but we do not expect much 
variation in the time span considered here. This variable is measured as the ratio between the 
regional population living in the main city of each province within the region and the residual 
regional population living in smaller centres. High values of this measure imply more 
agglomeration into fewer cities. We do not have a priori expectation on the sign of this 
variable since it might capture both congestion costs and agglomeration forces.
This index measures the number o f  offences like robberies in cars, apartments and shops, pick pocketing out 
o f the total number o f offences.
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Table 3 -  Modelling the location choice; description of explanatory variables employed 
in the conditional logit model
Variable Description Expected
sign
Source
Income per unit of 
labour
Income per unit of labour (employee) (current Euros) + Istat
Unemployment rate Regional unemployment rate (%) - Istat
Regional growth Growth rate of the regional Gross Domestic Product (3 
years)
+ Our calculations 
on ISTAT data
Preference Basilicata Region specific dummy variable; equals 1 for Basilicata 
in the choice set if the individual have expressed a 
preference for the home region in her job-market search 
activity after completion of the postgraduate course,
+ Questionnaire
Distance Distance from the province of origin (Potenza or Matera) 
to each Italian regional capital, Distance is expressed in 
100 KM by car
Our calculations
Distance squared Distance, as calculated above, squared + Our calculations
Distance adjusted Distance from the province of origin as measured before, 
modified by assigning value "zero" to regions where the 
individuals have attended university, master studies or the 
internship
Our calculations
Distance adjusted 
squared
Distance adjusted, as calculated above, squared + Our calculations
Past migrants Sum of migration outflows of individuals with high 
school or university degree ftom Basilicata to each Italian 
region, The variable is calculated summing flows for the 
last 5 years preceding the year of completion of the 
master course.
+ Our calculations 
on ISTAT data
Culture Expenditure per capita at a regional level for theatrical 
and musical performances (thousand of lire - constant 
price 1999 - values have been deflated using the 
consumer price index)
+ Istat
calculations on 
SIAE data
Crimel Percentage of micro-crime offences out of the total 
number of declared offences
Istat
Crime2 Number of violent episodes of crime per 10000 
inhabitants
Istat
Population density Index of population concentration; resident population in 
the provincial capital / (total resident population in the 
province) - (resident population in the provincial 
capital)* 100 (data 1999)
+/- Istat
Undergraduate Studies 
Location
Dummy variable; equals 1 for the region where the 
individual attended university and 0 otherwise (note: 
University of Salerno and Bari are considered in this 
study "home" (Basilicata) locations due to geographical 
and cultural proximity )
+ Questionnaire
Postgraduate Studies 
Location
Dummy variable; equals 1 for the region where the 
individual attended postgraduate studies and 0 otherwise 
(note: Salerno and Bari are considered in this study home 
(Basilicata) locations)
+ Questionnaire
Internship Location Dummy variable; equals 1 for the region where the 
individual attended the internship and 0 otherwise
+ Questionnaire
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The migration literature suggests that the stock of established migi’ants originating 
from the same location is relevant in explaining the pattern of subsequent migration streams 
(see Carrington et a l, 1996; Greenwood, 1969). Past migrants reduce the cost of migration 
for other migrants by facilitating the flow of information on employment opportunities and 
reducing the costs of adaptation to a new environment by means of direct or indirect support. 
We test this hypothesis by using a variable past migrants, which is measured as the sum of 
past migrants from Basilicata to any potential destination over the last five years preceding 
the end of the master course.^^ We expect therefore that a location with a relatively large 
stock of immigi’ants from Basilicata (with respect to the national mean) to be a more 
attractive destination.
Distance is employed as a proxy for direct economic costs and psychic costs related 
to migration. This variable is measured in hundreds of kilometres by road between the main 
city of the province of origin and the capital city of each potential destination. Distance for 
the home region is zero. We use also distance squared in order to investigate non-linear 
effects eventually associated with increasing distance. As pointed out by Davies et a l (2001) 
a significant advantage of using the conditional logit for studying migration is the possibility 
to investigate the effect of distance. In models where the set of alternative choices is not 
explicitly considered, distance is simply ruled out. The adverse effect of distance on 
migration is generally attributed to two alternative explanations: (/) increasing psychic costs 
as individuals move from the region of origin {it) the increasing costs and obstacles to 
information flows available to potential migrants on job opportunities in a set of destinations 
(Schwartz, 1973). These explanations should not be considered as mutually exclusive.
The variable is created by summing flows o f migrants with non-compulsory education levels (high school 
degree and above). As an alternative we have used a measure o f total migration flows and even if  the qualitative 
nature o f  the results does not change, the variable used in the analysis has a stronger explanatory power. Since it 
is difficult to assign a value for this variable in correspondence to the home location (Basilicata), we decided to 
consider the effects o f the variable only for the migrants. This approach is expected to control for any bias in the 
estimation o f  the relative coefficient.
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Since we are studying the migration decision of individuals coming from the same 
region of origin, we obviously observe in the data a higher propensity to select the home 
region. Some individuals will have an attachment toward this region which is explained by a 
set of economic and non-economic unobservable factors. The inclusion of a dummy variable 
for Basilicata (home-region fixed effect) should capture the effects of these unobservables. 
Nevertheless, individuals might or might not have a “home” attachment; this is particularly 
important given the nature of our sample, people who are likely to have a looser attachment 
to their home region compared with the rest of the population. In the questionnaire we have 
asked individuals about their geographical preferences in the job-market search after 
completion of the master course. We use this information to generate a dummy variable 
{Preference Basilicata) which is equal to one for region Basilicata in the choice set only for 
those individuals who have expressed a geographical preference for the home region. This 
should capture the “home” region attachment only for the individuals who really have such 
attachment.
4.3. Discussion o f the Empirical Results
The results of the conditional logit estimations are presented in table 4. As mentioned in the 
methodology section, since the explanatory variables have all been normalised (apart from 
distance variables) relative to the national average, the magnitude of the coefficient 
corresponds to its relative importance. Coefficients on non-dummy variables have an 
elastieity-like interpretation as described in equation (9).
Overall, the explanatory variables are statistically significant and have the expected 
sign. Version (A) presents estimation of a quite parsimonious model with a specification that 
is similar to others employed in migration literature. All variables are significant and have the
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expected influences on the attractiveness of a region. The second column, version (B), shows 
the contribution to the model estimation given by the inclusion of quality of life measures. 
The importance of quality of life variables for migration decision of highly educated and 
skilled individuals is confirmed by the fact that the variables culture, crimel and crim el are 
highly significative. Individuals are attracted towards location with higher cultural amenities 
and deterred from locations with diffused micro-criminality.
Version (C) and version (D) of the model display the importance of taking into 
consideration the effect of a “subjective” rather than a physical measure of distance. 
Migration is an important and complex decision for individuals and the amount of 
information required to make a choice might be quite substantial. A potential migrant will 
form his/her own subjective predictions on future income (or more generally, utility) streams 
in a given destination. Even within a rather homogeneous group of individuals as in this 
study, the available information and personal connections will differ gieatly. The probability 
that an individual will select a given location will increase the larger is the amount of 
information available on job opportunities in that location. It is an acknowledged fact in 
migration studies that the quantity and quality of information are negatively affected by 
distance (Lucas 2001). Knowledge about the destination region depends upon personal 
contacts and upon sources of information which are not universally available. Physical 
distance is a weak approximation for the difficulties in accessing the needed information.
Instead of using physical distance as a proxy for these costs, thanks to the quality of 
our data we are able to use a more appropriate measure of relative distance, which takes into 
account individuals’ past migration experiences. The hypothesis under analysis here is that 
individuals with previous migration experience of a particular destination have the 
opportunity to acquire information on the local labour market at low costs. It is also likely 
that non-monetary psychological costs of migration will be lowered as a result of increased
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familiarity with the local environment. It is to be expected that these individuals will have a 
higher probability of selecting that location. Our model uses information on individuals’ past 
migration experience during the undergraduate, and postgraduate study periods and during 
any period spent in an internship.
In version (C) we use two new variables distance adjusted and its square (see table 3 
for explanation) which incorporates information on the individual past migration experiences. 
As we can see, these two variables are highly significative and substantially improve the 
overall performance of the model. The estimated coefficients of these two variables do not 
differ dramatically from the previous two adopted. By using this specification we implicitly 
assume that past migration during the university studies, master studies and those for the 
internship have the same effect on the probability of selecting a certain location. Of course 
this might not be true since they represent episodes of an individual’s life with a different 
proximity to individual job-market seareh activities. For instance we might expect that the 
period of the internship and master course was more job-oriented than the university period. 
The importance of prior migration experiences is captured in thi'ee separate dummy variables 
in version (D): Undergraduate Studies Location, Postgraduate Studies Location and 
Internship Location (see table 3 for details). The internship considered here is part o f the 
postgraduate course financed by the regional authority and is not necessarily done in the same 
region where the course was held. As expected, and not surprisingly, an internship in a given 
location substantially improves the probability that the individual will remain there. This 
effect is stronger compared to that of Undergraduate and Postgraduate Studies Location, 
which are nevertheless quite important. The importance of these dummy variables in our 
study underlines how relevant is the availability of information on potential destinations for 
the individual’s migration decision process. A lack or poor quality of information on local
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economic opportunities represents a market failure that can be, at least partly, corrected 
through the use of simple policy measures.
Turning to the rest of coefficient estimates, the model confirms that economic 
opportunities in the potential destination are relevant for the location selection process. In 
version (D) a one-percent increase in income per unit of labour relative to the national mean 
has the strongest effect on migration probability (5.76% increase).R egions with higher 
unemployment rates deter migration. This result is in line with previous migration studies 
that have used micro-data and confirms the hypothesis that the unemployed are particularly 
sensitive to local unemployment rates.Faster-grow ing areas experience an above average 
immigration of highly skilled individuals as indicated by the positive and significant 
coefficient on regional GDP growth. This last effect, according to the estimated parameter, 
has a rather small magnitude.
The dummy variable for Basilicata is highly significant and positive. As mentioned 
before, this variable captures the effects of those unobservable characteristics (“home” 
attachment) for the individuals who have expressed a geographical preference for Basilicata.
We find that the migration probability declines with the distance between the origin 
and potential destination. There is strong support to conclude that this effect is non-linear. 
The negative effect of distance declines at greater distances (the marginal impact on the 
probability of migration toward a potential destination is decreasing in distance).
The existing stock of highly educated migrants from the region of origin {past 
migrants) plays an important role in explaining which location is selected among 
alternatives. This variable should capture a lower cost of migration towards the potential 
destination through ease of access to information and direct and indirect support. But it may
For a hypothetical region with average characteristics in year 2000, this means that an increase in income per 
unit o f labour o f Euros 280 (national average was Euros 28.050, in current prices) will lead, ceteris paribus, to a 
5.76% increase in the probability o f  attracting highly educated individuals.
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also capture the quality and quantity of economic opportunities in the destination region since 
the stocks of past migrants are generally proportional to the size of the population in 
alternative locations. In migration studies, it is common for the size of regional population or 
the level of GDP to be used as control variables capturing the quantity of opportunities. A 
larger region has a larger pool of locations to select and therefore potentially more 
opportunities. In our study these control variables were found not significant. Perhaps this 
result reflects the fact that the Italian Mezzogiorno is composed of some densely populated 
regions (such as Sicilia) for which it is hard to believe that population is a good proxy of 
economic opportunities available to the potential migrants.
Frequently migration studies based on aggregate data show mixed results on the sign and significance o f the 
unemployment rate variable.
Table 4 -  Modelling the locational choice: conditional logit estimates
Dependent variable: CHOICE Mod (A) Mod (B) Mod (C) Mod (D)
Income per unit of labour 18.164**(0.99)
13.881**
(1.41)
7.168**
(1.42)
6.060**
(1.74)
Unemployment rate -1.382** (0.28)
-0.767*
(0.38)
-0.692*
(0.36)
-0.752*
(0.45)
Regional growth 0.623**
(0.09)
0.299**
(0.10)
0.465**
(0.11)
0.368**
(0.12)
Preference Basilicata 1.915**
(0.25)
1.583**
(0.26)
1.849**
(0.24)
1.661**
(0.31)
Distance -1.088** 
(0.11)
-1.415** 
(0.16)
-0.909**
(0.19)
Distance squared 0.061**
(0.01)
0.098**
(0.01)
0.071**
(0.01)
Past migrants 1.508**
(0.07)
1.675**
(0.09)
1.583**
(0.09)
1.567**
(0.10)
Culture 1.954**
(0.35)
1.057**
(0.34)
1.436**
(0.41)
Crimel -4.864**
(0.74)
-5.535**
(0.84)
-5.078**
(0.91)
CrimeZ -0.776**
(0.31)
-0.597*
(0.31)
-0.800**
(0.36)
Population density 0.083
(0.15)
0.289*
(0.14)
0.292
(0.18)
Distance Adjusted -1.129**
(0.09)
Distance Adjusted squared 0.086**
(0.01)
Internship location 2.316**
(0.14)
Undergraduate studies location 0.966**
(0.15)
Postgraduate studies location 0.9795**
(0.14)
LL -1018.88 -985.02 -707.82 -652.99
McFadden's R2 .436 .455 .608 .639
BIC -1777.79 -1819.90 -2374.30 -2464.74
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% 
N =12060
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Table 5 - Conditional logit: interaction effects
Variables Version (E)
Income per Unit of Labour 6.207**
(1.76)
Unemployment rate -2.139**
(0.75)
Regional growth 0.40**
(0.12)
Preference Basilicata 1.735** 
(0.31)
Distance -0.790**
(0.22)
Distance squared 0.058**
(0.02)
Past migrants 1.636**
(0.11)
Culture 1.467** 
(0.42)
Crimel -5.421**
(0.93)
CrimeZ -0.890**
(0.37)
Population density 0.303*
(0.18)
Internship location 2.110**
(0.16)
Undergraduate studies location 0.592**
(0.25)
Postgraduate studies location 1.237** 
(0.16)
City * Distance -0.242*
(0.14)
City * Distance squared 0.027*
(0.01)
City* Undergraduate studies 
location
0.595**
(0.30)
Mark * Unemployment rate 0.033**
(0.01)
Master law * Unemployment rate 0.585**
(0.29)
Master law * Postgraduate studies 
location
-0.839**
(0.31)
Master law * Internship location 0.884**
(0.35)
Master engineering * Undergraduate 
studies location
1.193**
(0.44)
Master arts * Postgraduate studies 
location
1.257**
(0.58)
LL -629.86
McFadden's RZ 0.651
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; N,=1Z060; BIC=- 
Z453,30
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Along with economic opportunities, quality o f life is a very important aspect that 
should be taken into account by regional policymakers who aim at making their locations 
attractive to talented individuals. The weight attached to these amenities is considerable. 
Crime is a strong push factor. This is particularly true for highly educated individuals who are 
generally more footloose and therefore able to “react” more easily to such disamenities by 
relocating to safer areas. In our model the combined negative effects of crimel and crime2 
are remarkably high. Diffused criminality discourages the potential location decision by 
talented individuals and investors. Finally, population density has a weak positive effect on 
migration probability suggesting that highly skilled individuals are attracted toward more 
urbanised areas where agglomeration forces are strong and it is easier to have access to a 
more variegated and sophisticated bundle of goods and services. This result should be taken 
with caution since the variable appears insignificant in some versions of the model.
4.4 The relevance o f personal characteristics: some interaction effects
In the conditional logit the effect of personal characteristics on migration cannot be directly 
investigated. Instead we need to interact these variables with place characteristics. The results 
of the analysis of the importance of personal characteristics are presented in table 5.
Interactions between the dummy variable city with distance^ distance square and 
undergraduate studies location are found significant. As we have seen in the logit model, 
individuals who live in a larger agglomeration have a lower probability to migrate. The 
negative effect of distance for those born and living in a city is stronger and significant at the 
10% level. A potential destination which is 100 km further away from a region with average 
distance from Basilicata (520 1cm circa) has a probability of being selected which is -0.56% 
lower for those born in a city and -0.46% lower for those who are not. The interaction
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between city and undergraduate studies location has a positive sign, significant at 10% level. 
For these individuals the probability of remaining in the same region where university was 
attended is higher. With regard to this, we speculate that the choice of university location for 
these individuals already probably discounts a certain amount of inertia.^'
The interaction between the mark obtained at the end of bachelor’s degree and the 
unemployment rate {niark*unemployment rate) is positive and significant. This result 
indicates that the most able individuals among the sample are deterred less from areas with a 
higher unemployment rate. This is not surprising since these individuals are more able to 
compete in the job-market even in local economies with a reduced set of opportunities.^^ 
Finally we study the effects of the subject of master studies on migration probabilities. 
Individuals with a post-giaduate education in law and political science are less discouraged 
by high unemployment area {master law^ unemployment rate). A  considerable share of these 
individuals will continue their training to become lawyers or fiscal advisors after the 
university and master. In Italy, for these professions a training period of two to three years 
after the bachelor’s degree is required. For this reason a apprenticeship period is compulsory 
for embarking on these careers. Generally it is easier to obtain it in a location where the 
individual has strong personal connections. This explains the positive interaction of master 
law (master in law and political science) with the dummy variable for undergraduate studies 
and internship location, and the negative interaction with the dummy on postgraduate 
studies* location. The period of time spent during the master is probably not enough to build 
the necessary connections to obtain a apprenticeship position.
Individuals with a degree in engineering or arcliitecture {master engineering) are 
more likely to locate in the region where their university course was held, while the region
A tabulation o f the two variables eonfirms that individuals born in Matera and Potenza are slightly more 
likely to study in a “home” university.
The introduction o f this variable significantly reduces the standard error estimate for the unemployment rate 
measure in the model.
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where the master was attended is more important for individuals with education in literature 
studies, languages and arts in general {master arts). We also found weak support for the fact 
that individuals with a more business oriented educational background are more likely to 
migrate toward more densely populated areas.
It is worth mentioning that the migration behaviour with respect to gender does not 
show any significant difference in the conditional logit. The interaction effects of the dummy 
variable male were all statistically insignificant.
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5. Final comments
The existing migration literature points out that the propensity of highly skilled and educated 
individuals to migrate is high when compared to the rest of the population (Antolin and 
Bover, 1997; Haapanen, 2003; Hughes and McCormick, 1989; Molho, 1987; Levine, 1996; 
Ritsila and Ovaskainen, 2001). However, to the best of our knowledge, few studies have 
conducted an in depth investigation into the factors explaining the geographical pattern of 
their decisions.
In this paper we focus our attention on the micro-level location decisions of highly 
skilled and educated individuals, who constitute one of the most important resources in 
modern economies. We employ data on a sample of individuals residing in a small peripheral 
Italian region (Basilicata) who have benefited from a locally funded human capital 
investment policy. Our results show that even within a quite homogeneous gioup of 
individuals, there are key personal characteristics that affect the migration propensity.
Understanding the factors explaining the location decision of talented individuals is of 
considerable importance, particularly in the light of increasing regional economic integration 
which makes this gi'oup of individuals extremely footloose.
As highlighted in this paper, among the factors explaining individuals’ location 
decision, quality of life is very important. For this reason policy interventions aimed at 
improving the quality of citizens’ lives should be regarded as very attractive. Diffused 
criminality discourages potential location decisions by talented individuals and investors. We 
believe this is a quite important factor explaining the poor economic performance for some 
areas of the Italian Mezzogiorno, which otheiivise should be considered particularly attractive 
given the high quality and large quantity of human capital available. This consideration is not
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intended to discount the importance of regional economic performance, which should be 
considered as a pre-requisite for attracting highly skilled and talented individuals. We want to 
emphasise that improving quality of life can lead to a substantial pay-off in terms of future 
growth and prosperity of peripheral regions.
Finally, we are able to assess the relative importance of the availability of information 
on potential destinations for the individuals’ migration decision process. Lack or poor quality 
of information on local economic opportunities represents a market failure that can be, at 
least partly, corrected by adequate policy measures. Actions aimed at this purpose might, 
therefore, be considered as strategic in trying to maintain and attract human capital.
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Chapter 4
Conduct of the survey, design of the questionnaire 
and sample selection issues
Nicola D. Coniglio
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1. Introduction
The data employed in the analysis have been collected directly by the author by means of a 
postal survey. A comprehensive assessment of the research presented in the previous chapter 
cannot leave aside the methodological procedure used for generating the data set. In addition, 
the methodological process in itself can be considered a worthwhile contribution, given the 
possibility to replicate it in similar, future research. The aim of this chapter is to provide 
details of the data collection method that has been employed, outline the different steps of the 
survey process and describe the design of the questionnaire. Moreover, we discuss sample 
selection issues in our empirical investigation.
This chapter is organised as follows. In section 2, we define the research issues which 
constitute the root of the survey and the associated data requirement. In section 3, we 
motivate our choice of adopting a postal survey and present the initial phases of the 
questionnaire’s design. The conduct of the survey and the rate of response are outlined in 
section 4. Section 5 contains a digression on the sample selection issue. The covering letter 
and the questionnaire are reported in the appendix.
2. Research issues and data requirement
The definition of the research objectives and a clear investigation of the associated data 
requirements are the backbone of any rigorous empirical investigation. The first step of our 
survey was devoted to determining the main questions we wanted to address. As highlighted 
in previous chapter, our focus is on the micro-level migratory behaviour of a particularly 
important stratum of the population: highly talented and skilled individuals. Knowledge of
100
the factors explaining the location decision of talented individuals is of considerable interest, 
in particular in the light of increasing regional economic integration which makes this group 
of individuals extremely footloose. If policy makers, in particular in peripheral regions, are to 
capitalise on highly skilled and educated individuals, regarded as one of the most important 
resources in modern economies, a first step is to understand the migratory behaviour of such 
individuals. This knowledge can then be used in a strategic way to formulate talent attraction 
and retention policies.
The individuals who benefited from the human capital investment policy adopted by 
Regione Basilicata constitute a natural experiment for making inference about this particular 
stratum of the population. The regional authority imposes no requirements on the subject and 
location of the course financed. The selection criteria concern educational attainment of the 
candidate and the “quality” and reputation of the educational institution which offers the 
courses.' The policy is very selective toward high quality candidates representative of the 
population of young and highly educated individuals to whom our attention is focused.
Our analysis explores the factors affecting the location decision of highly educated 
individuals in an economy possessing all the features of a core-periphery structure.^ In the 
previous chapter the empirical analysis aimed at addressing the following two sets of 
questions:
1) Who are the migrants? Is there a significant difference according to some personal 
characteristics between migrants and non-migrants?
' These regulations are aimed at avoiding courses o f  questionable quality, An applicant with a successful 
educational record willing to embark upon further investment in their education will veiy likely obtain regional 
suppoif. The rejection rate is very small and is based mainly on considerations that pertain to qualitative aspects 
o f  course choice.
 ^ O f course, as with all case studies, it is necessary to exercise caution when generalising the findings to other 
situations. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue that the behaviour o f the highly educated and skilled 
individuals in our sample is not substantively different from that o f  similar individuals in peripheral regions o f  
many developed countries.
101
2) Where do migrants go? What are the regional characteristics that make a region 
attractive for highly educated and talented individuals?
In addition to the outlined main research issues, other objectives were defined during 
the initial phase of survey design. These include investigations concerning the labour market 
performance of the sample under analysis (duration of the unemployment spells, use of 
different job search methods, etc.). Another set of research issues, influential in the design of 
the survey, relates to the specific policy undertaken and is mainly aimed at providing Regione 
Basilicata with useful information for assessing and improving the policy measure adopted 
(quality of the course financed, importance of the regional contribution, geographical 
diffusion of the policy etc.). Subsequent phases of survey design, in particular the definition 
of the items to be included in the questionnaire, reflect these planned research objectives.
Diagram 1 gives a stylised picture of the individual data collected in order to address 
the stated research questions. In particular, we collected data on: (i) personal characteristics 
which might affect migratory behaviour (sex, age, level and type of education etc.); (ii) the 
course financed by the regional authority (quality, location, duration etc.); (hi) job market 
search activity (methods used to find a job, preferred location, unemployment spell); and (iv) 
space-time career details from first to current employment status.
Once the data requirement for the empirical investigation was established the second 
phase implied the definition of the data collection method and the design of the questionnaire.
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Diagram 1 - Data requirement: a stylised picture
Individual Higher education
characteristics (undergraduate
studies)
Further education
Employment
Home
f
Policy
Intervention
Job-search
strategy
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3, Data collection method and design o f the questionnaire
Given the relatively limited number of beneficiaries of the regional policy intervention, i.e. 
slightly more than one thousand, the survey was administered to all o f them. For this reason, 
sampling was not an issue in our survey.^
For reasons mainly related to the cost of the survey, the data collection method chosen 
was a self-administered questionnaire mailed to each individual address. Different 
administration modes typically have different non-response rates, the highest being generally 
in postal surveys. The main disadvantage of postal surveys is associated with the “response 
inertia” which might seriously reduce the percentage of returned questionnaires and, 
therefore, might compromise the empirical analysis. The main factors affecting this inertia 
are the following:
1) length of the questionnaire;
2) cost of retmning the questionnaire;
3) distrust by the respondent of the aims of the survey;
4) ‘sensitive items’, for instance those regarding income, which might induce respondents 
not to return the questionnaire or to leave it incomplete.
Particular attention was devoted to minimising the response inertia.
Keeping in mind the data requirements, a first version of the survey questionnaire was 
constructed using the following key principles in designing each question:
The respondent should clearly understand what she or he is being asked.
The respondent can be expected to know the answer to the question.
The respondent should easily understand how the answer should be given.
 ^ Generally, the sampling strategy is one o f  the initial steps o f  survey design. It is a veiy delicate issue since the 
reliability o f  a survey and also its costs increase as the sample size increases.
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After this step was taken, the questionnaire was administered to 15 individuals who had 
attended a postgraduate course (not necessarily financed by Regione Basilicata, hence not 
part of our final sample). Selected individuals were asked to complete a preliminary version 
of the questionnaire, which met all the requirements pointed out in the previous section. After 
completion of the submitted questionnaires, we investigated respondents’ opinions about the 
length of the questionnaire and the complexity and possible ambiguity of each single item 
(pre-test). Several modifications of the questionnaire were undertaken as a consequence of 
the pre-test. In addition, sensitive items and other items that generated some confusion to the 
respondent were identified.
Two competing formats of the questionnaire were defined: version (A) and version 
(B). Both versions were designed to gather the same set of information from the respondent, 
but some of the items were formulated in different ways. For instance, the item regarding the 
current gross yearly income was designed as ‘open question’ in version (A) and as ‘closed -  
ranked question’ in version (B). We conducted a split panel test, with the two formats, in 
order to evaluate the impact of wording and question order on the rate of response. In 
addition, we checked for the complexity or ambiguity of some items not revealed by the pre­
test. Forty individuals were randomly selected from the list of beneficiaries of the regional 
policy. We submitted to each half of the sample a different version of the questionnaire.
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Table 1: Questionnaire design: main results of the split panel test
Number of Number of Rate of Average time
questionnaires questionnaires response of response
sent returned (days)
Version A 25 10 40% 45
Version B 25 14 56% 40
The split panel test took place between February and April 2002. On the basis of the evidence 
of the test (see table 1), we decided to select version (B) of the questionnaire. In fact, version 
(B) performed better than version (A) both in terms of rate of response (56% versus 40%, 
respectively) and, to a lesser extent, in terms of average time of response (40 versus 45 
days). Further useful information was collected on possible improvements of the 
questionnaire during this phase.
Using pre-stamped freepost envelopes solved the issue concerning the cost to the 
respondent of returning the questionnaire. In order to increase the motivation to fill in the 
questionnaire, in a cover letter: (i) we informed the respondents on why the survey was being 
conducted; (ii) we stressed the importance of their answer as a means of improving the 
effectiveness of the policy; (hi) and reassured them about the confidentiality of the data 
collected (see appendix 1). The name of the designated respondent was unequivocally 
indicated in the questionnaire and in a cover letter. All the postal correspondence and 
inquiries were directed to an official of the regional authority as a guarantee of the reliability 
of the survey.
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4. Conduct o f the survey and rate o f response
The survey questionnaire, resulting from the phases outlined above, was mailed in May 2002 
to all the individuals who benefited from the local policy measure from 1991 (the first year in 
which this measure was implemented) to 2001, which amounts to slightly more than one 
thousand individuals/ The English version of the questionnaire is reported in appendix 2.
After 45 days from the initial dispatch, a letter of reminder and a new copy of the 
questiomiaire was mailed to non-respondents. In order to reduce ‘response inertia’, these 
individuals were subsequently contacted by phone. In case the individuals had changed 
residence, the new address was collected and a new questionnaire was sent.
By mid-September, a total of 740 individuals returned the questionnaire, 
approximately 70% of the total. After deleting observations relating to incomplete 
questionnaires, the usable sample contains 700 observations (see table 2).
Table 2 -  Description of non-usable questionnaires
Motivation Number
Missing relevant information on undergraduate studies (location, final 14
mark or year of completion)
Missing relevant information on career histoiy (only sections (a) and (b) 32
of the questionnaire were completed)
Returned blank_________________________________________       5
Note: the total from this table differs fi’om 40 since more than one motivation for non-usability might co-exist 
for the same questionnaire.
Approximately 3.5% o f the questionnaires were returned unanswered because o f wrong address provided to us 
by the regional authority.
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5. Sample selection issue
Sample selection problems arise when the sample studied represents a sub-group which is not 
representative of the entire population whose behaviour is under analysis. Given the nature of 
our sample, young and highly educated individuals, our results are intended to be generalised 
to the fraction of the population composed only by young, talented and skilled individuals in 
peripheral regional economies such Basilicata. The most likely causes of sample selection 
problems in micro-data based migration studies aie the following (see also Greenwood, 
1997): (1) sampling design and population coverage', (2) time-dependent disturbances and
(3) different rates o f  response to the survey. We briefly comment, using the same order, on 
the relevance of these problems to the data employed in our work. With regard to the first 
point, as previously said, our analysis is conducted on highly educated individuals who have 
benefited from a measure aimed at financing individuals’ human capital formation. These 
individuals represent the upper tail of the regional population educational attainment 
distribution. In principle this sample is a good proxy for the targeted population we aim to 
analyse.^
The decision tree for an individual wishing to obtain policy support is illustrated in 
diagram 2. In stage 1, highly educated individuals can choose to apply to the regional 
authority in order to get financial support for further investment in their human capital 
accumulation. Since the regional authority imposes no requirements on the subject and 
location of the course that could be attended and given the high public knowledge about this 
policy intervention, the potential problem of sample selection at this stage is rather small. 
Presumably those individuals with very high costs associated with a further investment in 
human capital will not apply, but this is exactly what we want, namely to include only
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talented and skilled individuals. In stage 2, an individual who has applied might be accorded 
funds or not. The selection criteria imposed by the regional authority concern educational 
attainment of the candidate and the “quality” and reputation of the educational institution 
which offers the courses. Once again, the policy is selective towards high quality candidates. 
We therefore argue that the sample under scrutiny (right-hand-side of the decisional tree at 
stage 3) is representative of the population of young and highly educated individuals at whom 
our attention is focused.
The problem of time dependent disturbances is probably not veiy serious since we 
consider individual migration decision over a decade. Even if changes in the general pattern 
of migration are possible, we do not expect them to be dramatic. In addition, in the second 
part of our investigation (conditional logit model) we avoid the problem by using time- 
dependent explanatory variables.
With regard to the third point, the questionnaire was sent to all the beneficiaries o f the 
policy from its start in 1991 until 2001. This amounts to approximately one thousand 
individuals. Since the rate of response to our postal survey was considerable (70%), we 
believe that a strong selection bias due to non-responses is very unlikely.^
 ^The number o f  observations at our disposal is considerable if eompared to the total regional population that in 
the last census was slightly less than six hundred thousands (individuals between 25-29 years were 48 thousand 
in 1997).
 ^ An investigation into the causes o f non-response was eonducted by tracking a number o f non-respondents. 
Apart from the usual inertia in answering to postal surveys, a relevant share o f  the non-responses was due to 
inaccurate transcription o f  individual postal addresses in the documentation provided by the regional authority.
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Diagram 2
Potential sample selection: individuaPs decision tree
STAGE I:
APPLY FOR 
THE REGIONAL 
FLHMDS OR NOT
STAGE 2: 
IF NOT: STAGE 2: IF YES:
MIGRATE OR 
NOT
FUNDED OR 
NOT FUNDED
STAGE 3: 
IF YES:STAGE 3: IF NOT:
MIGRATE OR 
NOTMIGRATE OR NOT
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REGIONE BASILICATA
Appendix 1 -  Conduct o f the survey: Cover Letter
Dear Name Surname,
We write to you with reference to the ‘Borsa di Formazione’, sponsored by Regione 
Basilicata, you benefited from in 1995 for enrolling a master course.
As you know, through ‘Borse di Formazione’, Regione Basilicata offers, to young and 
talented individuals o f our region, financial support aimed at acquiring valuable expertise and 
skills.
Given the relevance o f this policy measure and the considerable amount o f financial resource 
employed, we believe that it is necessary to proceed with an accurate and comprehensive 
evaluation o f its effectiveness and efficiency.
Important lessons can be learned directly from the beneficiaries of the policy measure. In 
particular, by paying the utmost attention to the observations and opinions about their 
experiences and by monitoring their subsequent job market performances.
For this purpose, our bureau has designed a questionnaire, which you will find herewith 
attached. The aim o f the questionnaire is that o f collecting information on the course you 
attended and your subsequent career history. All the information will be elaborated in 
anonymous form. We kindly ask you to complete the questionnaire and promptly return it, in 
one o f the ways described below.
We would like to stress that the information we ask you to kindly provide, together with 
those o f other beneficiaries, will enable us to deliver policy measures which improve more 
effectively the well-being o f our local community.
Thank you for your effort and assistance.
Sincerely,
Doctor Vinicio Capossela
Director o f Ufficio Formazione Professionale
Regione Basilicata
Important: in case the person concerned has changed place o f residence, we should be most 
grateful if you would communicate the new address/telephone number or email address to 
our bureau. Please use your preferred following option to communicate with us:
• Mail (using the pre-stamped envelope)
• Fax n. +390000001 (to the attention o f Ms. Bellini);
• Telephone n. +300000002 (Ms. Bellini)
• Email: Bellini@Regione.Basilicata.it
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REGIONE BASILICATA
Appendix 2 - SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
The information you supply will be elaborated in anonymous form. Information will be 
treated in accordance with Legge n. 675 del 31/12/1996 “Tutela delle persone e di altri 
soggetti rispetto al trattamento dei dati personali”.[Privacy law]
How to return the questionnaire:
by mail: address to Regione Basilicata (using the freepost envelope provided) 
by fax: Regione Basilicata fax n. 0039/1111111
For help and further information please contact: Dott.ssa Stefania Bellini -  Regione 
Basilicata -  Dip.to Formazione -  Corso Italia 1 -  1000 Potenza (PZ)
Tel. +39000001 
Fax. +39000002
Email address: B ellin i@ R eg io n eB a silica ta .it
Section (A) - Persona! details
Name and Surname 
Date o f birth place o f birth
Current address
University degree obtained 
year_______ final mark___ at the University of_
Are you married? □ YES, □ NO; (if YES, is your partner employed? □ YES C NO)
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Section (B) -  Information on the course financed by Regione Basilicata
(I) Postgraduate course attended_____________________________________________
Educational Institution
Length (in months)_____________Location
(2) At that time, would you have enrolled in the course regardless the financial contribution 
of Regione Basilicata? □ YES □ NO
(3) What is your opinion on the overall quality o f the course attended?
(5 = very good, 4 = good, 3 = adequate, 2 = poor, 1 = very poor)
□ 5, 0 4, 0 3, 0 2, 0 1
(4) How do you think the course contributed to your subsequent placement in the job market? 
(3 = very important, 2 = useful, 1 = not relevant)
0 3, 0 2, 0 1
(5) Have you obtained an internship as part o f the master/course attended?
0 YES 0 NO
if YES, specify: Institution_________________________________________________
Location__________________________________ Length in months
(6) What is your opinion on the experiences acquired during the internship period? 
(5 = very good, 4 = good, 3 = adequate, 2 = poor, 1 = very poor)
0 5, 0 4, 0 3, 0 2, 0  1
Further remarks on the master/course attended
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REGIONE BASIUCATA
Section (C) -  Job market search and first employment after the course
At the end o f your course, which active steps have you taken to find a job?
You have (insert an X  where appropriate)
used the support o f the same Institution where you attended the master/course 
used Internet
replied to an advertisement 
asked friends or other contacts
used the support o f a Job Centre/Employment Agency or other public/private
institution (describe___________________________________________ )
 taken steps to start your own business (describe___________________________)
 other (describe_________________________________________________________ )
(2) At the end o f your course, which would have been your preferred location?
( 1 = first choice', 2 = second choice)
Basilicata
Region in which you attended university studies 
Region in which you attended the financed course/master 
Another Italian region (specify________________________
Abroad (specify____________________________________)
No preferences
(3) After how many months from completion of the course did you found your first 
employment?
C _______ (indicate the number o f months) C I have never worked'
' In this case the questionnaire for you ends here. Thank you for your time and effort.
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REGIONE BASIUCATA
(4) At completion o f your course, have you received more than one job proposal? 
□ YES □ NO
if YES, indicate in which region:
in Basilicata □ in an other region □ (specify
give a brief description o f the job proposals________________
(5> At the end of your course, which was your first employment? 
(insert an X where appropriate)
(a) □ Self-employed 
describe
Location
Date o f start: month__________year
(h) □ Employee (permanent position) or C Employee (short-term job)
at_____________________________________________________________
Location_________________________ position covered______________
C Private company □ Public sector
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(7) Which o f the following factors do you acknowledge to have been relevant in influencing 
your decision between alternative opportunities?
(insert an X where appropriate)
higher remuneration 
better career prospects and opportunities 
preferred geographical location 
typology o f job preferred
geographical location suitable for your partner and/or other memberst o f your family 
other reasons (specify____________________________________________________ )
17
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Section (D) - Current employment position
(1) Describe your current employment position only if it is different from the one you 
described in the previous section 
(insert an X where appropriate)
(a) □ Unemployed (since: month______________________ year___________________)
(h) □ Self-employed describe__________________________________________________
Location_________________________ type o f work_________________________________
(c) □ Employee (permanent position) or □ Employee (short-term job)
at ________________________________________________________
Location_________________________ position_covered______________
C Private company C Public sector
Date o f start: month__________ year______________________________
(2) In which o f the following income brackets is your yearly gross income included?
□ less than € 20,000; □ between € 20,000 and € 40,000; C
between € 40,000 and € 60,000; C more than € 60,000
(3) For how long had you been unemployed before starting the job described in this section?
_______ (indicate the number o f months)
(4) Which o f the following factors do you acknowledge to have been relevant in influencing
the change from your previous job?
(insert an X  where appropriate)
 Employer’s decision (layoff, end o f short-term job contract, etc.)
 Higher remuneration
 Better career prospects and opportunities
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Preferred geographical location 
Typology o f job preferred
Geographical location suitable for your partner or other members o f your family 
Other reasons (specify____________________________________________________ )
(Only if you currently do not work in Basilicata)
(5) In your opinion, which difficulties would you probably expect if you wanted to carry out 
your current type o f work in our region?
(3 = very relevant difficulty', 2 ^fairly relevant', 1 = not relevant)
D a lack o f employment opportunities comparable to your current employment position;
C lower remuneration;
□ lower quality o f life for you and your family;
C geographical location not suitable for your partner or other members o f your family
□ other (specify___________________________________     )
(6) If you had the chance (i.e. obtaining a job position as preferred as your current one) 
would you be willing to move in Basilicata?
C YES CNO
(7) if YES, would you be willing to move, even accepting a lower remuneration?
C YES CNO
if YES, a reduction no lower than
C 5%, C 10%, C15%, □ >  15%
1 19
REGIONE BASIUCATA
Further considerations, comments or suggestions
Important: if your first employment after the course {Section C) also represents your 
actual job status {Section D) and no changes of job and/or location have occurred, the 
questionnaire for you ends here. Otherwise continue with Section (E).
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Section (E) - Chronology o f further relevant changes in your employment status
Note: in this section o f the questionnaire you are kindly requested to give some information 
related to changes in job status and/or job location intercurred between your first and last 
employment.
Please describe these changes starting from the firts change after your first job (as 
reported in Section (C)) until the last change before your current employment.
Change n. 1
Have you changed your employment location?
C YES C NO
(if YES, was the change o f location due to your own decision? □ YES G NO)
Have you started a new job?
C YES C NO
if YES, specify the following information relative to the new job:
tipology_________________________________________________________________
location
starting date:month___________________year
For how long have you been unemployed before starting the new job? 
_______ (indicate the number o f months)
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Which o f the following factors do you acknowledge to have been relevant in influencing the 
change from your previous position?
(insert an X  where appropriate)
 Employer’s decision (layoff, end o f short-term job contract, etc.)
 Higher remuneration
 Better career prospects and opportunities
 Preferred geographical location
 Typology o f job preferred
 Geographical location suitable for your partner or other members o f your family
 Other reasons (please specify______________________________________________)
Change n. 2
Have you changed your employment location?
C YES C NO
(if YES, was the change o f location due to your own decision? C YES D NO)
Have you started a new job?
□ YES C NO
if YES, specify the following information relative to the new job:
tipology____________________________________________________
location
starting date:month___________________year
For how long have you been unemployed before starting the new job? 
_______ (indicate the number o f months)
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Which o f the following factors do you acknowledge to have been relevant in influencing the 
change from your previous position?
(insert an X  where appropriate)
 Employer’s decision (layoff, end o f short-term job contract, etc.)
 Higher remuneration
 Better career prospects and opportunities
 Preferred geographical location
 Typology o f job preferred
 Geographical location suitable for your partner or other members of your family
 Other reasons (please specify_______________________________________________ )
Other changes
Th a n k  y o u  f o r  y o u r  t i m e  a n d  e f f o r t
In  c a s e  y o u  a r e  in t e r e s t e d  in  r e c e iv in g  THE RESULTS OF THIS SURVEY, WE WILL BE 
PLEASED TO SEND THE FINAL REPORT TO YOUR E MAIL ADDRESS
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Chapter 5
Migropolis: networks and formation of ethnic communities in cities
Nicola D. Coniglio*
My special thanks go to the following persons who provided valuable comments and suggestions: Kjetil 
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7. Introduction
Several theoretical contributions have attempted to explain the geographical concentration of 
migrants from the same source region which is a frequently observed pattern of migration 
experiences. While a large set of potential destinations exist, migration is often only 
channelled into a very limited number where migrants networks are established already. 
Carrington et al. (1996) and Chau (1997) both provide a dynamic model of labour migration 
in which moving costs decrease with the number of established migrants in a particular 
destination. They show that once started, migration flows from the same source area 
accelerate even while inter-regional income gaps are reduced. In addition, in many empirical 
studies of migration, the stock of established migrants from the same area/country is almost 
always found to be a positive and significant explanatory variable. Moving costs are 
endogenous and decreasing in the size of past migration flows and subsequent waves of 
migration benefit from information and support provided by established migrants. '
While the passive aspect of this migration dynamic has been previously recognised in 
the literature, the active role o f established migrants has been largely ignored. Why do 
established migrants give support to newcomers? Given the considerable amount of effort 
often involved in these support activities, and given that support is not generally confined to 
family members but is often a community wide phenomenon, we have reason to believe that 
pure altruism is an important explanatory variable, but not the only one.^
‘ For empirical studies on migration networks which use micro-data level see Winters et al (2001), Munshi 
(2003), Chiswick and Miller (2002), Bauer et al (2002).
 ^ Some recent contributions have emphasised the importance not only o f  ‘‘strong ties'” such as households 
components or kin but also o f “weak ties” as acquaintances and co-villagers. See Wilson (1998) on the 
importance o f weak ties in Mexican migration networks in the US and Grannovetter (1973, 1982) on the 
importance o f weak ties, in general, in locating employment opportunities. In their empirical study on Mexican 
migration networks in the US, Winters et al (2001) are able to disentangle the relative effects o f  strong (family) 
and weak (community) ties on migration propensity and migrants’ location decision.
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In this paper we extend previous models of chain migration by considering migration 
as a community-wide phenomenon where established migrants strategically provide support 
to newcomers. This active role of support provision is associated with positive externalities 
which new incoming migrants might have on migrants already settled in the host country.
To the best of our knowledge, the work by Stark and Wang (2002) is the only one to 
deal with the same issue. In their model, support to newcomers in a particular location is 
provided only by highly skilled established migiunts motivated not by altruistic consideration 
but by pure self-interest. High-skilled migrants have an incentive to attract low-skilled 
migrants since working with a larger number of these individuals renders their skills 
relatively more scarce (and therefore more valuable), which in turn has a positive effect on 
their wages. Their approach postulates the existence of a “migi'ants’ production function” 
where high and low-skilled migrants are jointly employed. Once in the host location, low- 
skilled migrants become high skilled in the next period through an on-the-job skill 
enhancement process. In turn, they will provide support to a new wave of low skilled 
migrants giving rise to a migration chain. In our opinion, this approach has some 
shortcomings. Firstly, it is not obvious why established low-skilled migrants would not use 
remittances strategically in order to keep potential new-comers at home (as in Stark 1999 or 
Docquier and Rapoport 1998). In addition, migiation chains are a phenomena which take 
place within components of the same source location community. A model which tries to 
explain migration chains on the basis of production externalities, as Stark and Wang 2002, 
would not a priori exclude the possibility to observe natives or high-skilled migiants giving 
support to low-skilled migiants belonging to different ethnic groups, such as Indian and 
Chinese high-skilled workers giving support to Mexican low-skilled workers. Such a 
proposition is not empirically supported in migration studies. Furthermore, support by 
established migrants is not confined to high-skilled migrants providing help to low-skilled
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ones. Support appears to go beyond differences in skills. Support is often more pronounced 
between low-skilled migrants directly competing in the host locality labour market, as was 
the case for Italians and Irish immigrants in the US at the begimiing of the last century. In a 
recent study on the contribution of Chinese and Indians scientists and engineers to the Silicon 
Valley economy, Saxenian (1999) documents the existence of dense ethnic networks within 
these highly skilled immigrants.^
In this paper, we view migration networks not merely as an aseptic instrument to 
facilitate immediate settlement of individual migrants but as the manifestation of a long-term 
development of a new community (or reconstruction of the lost one). A quote from a study on 
migration chains of Italians in Australia conducted by Lever-Tracy and Holton (2001) is 
emblematic of the main idea of this paper;
“ ...He {an established migrant who helped many newcomers) just wanted as many Italians as 
possible in Australia...The more Italians came out the less foreign one would feel.” (page 94)
We propose a model that explains both established migrants’ support to newcomers 
and the formation of ethnic communities on the basis of the existence of “ethnic consumption 
externalities”. Incoming migrants from the same ethnic community have an expansionistic 
effect on the number of ethnic-specific non-tradable goods and services available to 
established migrants in the host region. Culturally-based tastes for particular goods and 
services generate an ethnic consumer demand and only individuals from the same etlinic 
community have the skills or the “insider’s information” required to provide these goods 
(protected market). If the ethnic population is large enough, an ethnic sector will emerge and
 ^ Ethnic networks for these professionals are often institutionalised into professional associations. Virtually no 
overlap exists between different ethnic groups. These organisations combine elements o f  traditional immigrant 
culture and professional networking and exchange o f information. They play a key role in supporting new 
immigrants in their professional and social adjustment in the US.
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eventually grow as the population expands further. Migrant communities in almost every big 
city around the world provide a wide range of ethnic goods and services. Ethnic specific 
goods and services include for instance preparation of ethnic foods, banking and financial 
services, ethnic media such as magazines, radio, newspapers, religious services, organised 
unions, political groups and usually a vast array of migrant associations.
As the size of the ethnic community grows larger and larger, discrimination in the 
labour market, prejudice and hostility from the larger society generate negative externalities 
which might offset any positive effect. For instance, during the Great Migration, African 
Americans in northern US cities became increasingly visible and as a consequence racist acts 
and violence against them increased. Congestion costs as the community expands might also 
be linked to the existence of a limited stock of housing or to increased competition in the 
labour market, compressing wages.
The trade-off between these two opposing forces implies the existence of an optimal 
size of an ethnic community. In a recent contribution, Bauer et al. (2002) find evidence of an 
inverse U-shaped relationship between the number of Mexican migrants from the same 
village of origin to a particular US location and the probability that subsequent migrants from 
the same village will also choose that destination. Too many immigrants from the same 
village in a particular location decreases the probability of choosing that location.
Although migration chains and the formation of ethnic communities characterise 
immigration and emigration experiences of many countries (both developed and LDCs) 
across all periods of human history, not all migration flows follow this pattern. Even more 
interesting is the fact that in this regard ethnic groups sometimes have different migratory 
behaviour.'' In our model, according to the degree of preferences toward ethnic consumption.
Ethnic concentration o f  migrants is not a phenomenon characterising only migration flows o f low-skilled 
migrants from poor countries, as it is sometimes believed. For instance, a study by Glebe (1986) shows that the 
Japanese community in Düsseldorf is the most concentrated o f all minorities in that city. White (1998) conducts 
a related study on the pattern o f settlement o f  developed countiy migrants’ in London. Jewish communities
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the mobility costs of the souree country population and congestion costs (hostility 
externalities) in the host location, different scenarios arise. These scenarios provide a possible 
explanation for variations in the observed migration patterns of different etlinic 
communities/
In section 2 we provide a brief review of recent empirical work on migi*ation networks. A 
discussion on the definition and nature of ethnic goods is presented in section 3. In section 4 
we outline the basic structure of the model and analyse the interaction between the preference 
for ethnic consumption and the size of the ethnic community in a given host location. We 
derive the conditions under which strategic support by established migrants is observed and 
the implications on the size of the ethnic community. In the same section alternative 
scenarios are outlined. Section 5 concludes.
2. Migration networks, the role o f established migrants and new immigrants’ location 
decision
Established migrants often provide direct assistance to new migrants. They might help 
finance transportation costs, provide housing or pre-arrange jobs. In addition, established 
migrants in the network supply information, which allows recipients to assess more carefully 
the expected returns from migration. Nelson (1959) has classified information on which 
potential migrants form their expectations into two main categories: specific and generalised 
information. Specific information implies knowledge about particular opportunities, while 
generalised information concern the awareness about the attractiveness of opportunities in a 
location. Established migrants have a fundamental role in eonveying both types of
around the world represent another example o f ethnic concentration mainly aimed at preserving the community 
identity and an ethnic social capital,
 ^For empirical evidence on the clustering patterns o f  immigrants by country o f origin or ethnic group see 
Zavodny (1999) and Chiswick et al (2002) for the US and Australia respectively.
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information. In particular, by providing specific information and direct assistance they 
considerably reduce migration costs for incoming migrants.
In his study of rural-to-urban migration in India, Banerjee (1984) finds that over one- 
half of the migrants left their place of origin because of suggestions to migrate received from 
contacts (relatives of friends) settled in the urban area. A considerable share of these migiunts 
had a pre-ananged job or received assurances of urban employment before leaving the rural 
area. Menjivar (1995) shows that for newly arrived Mexican migrants in California it is 
common to be hosted by kin (relatives but also members of their hometown), borrowing 
money and receive other important form of assistance from them.
The availability of migration networks in certain host locations significantly affects 
individuals’ migration decisions. The probability of migration to the US is higher for 
Mexican households with prior migration experience and for households originating from 
communities with extensive migration history (Massey and Garcia Espana, 1987).^
Migration networks, and the resulting exchange of information and support, are not 
only the result of “strong ties” such as those within households or kin but also of “weak ties” 
such as acquaintances and co-villagers.^ In a recent article, Winters et al. (2001) find strong 
support of the positive influence of migrants networks on (i) the decision to migiate; (ii) 
where to migrate and (iii) the number of migrants sent by a Mexican household. In their 
investigation, they are able to disentangle the separate effects on migration probability of 
strong (family) and weak (community) ties. They find that family and community networks 
are substitutes in the generation of information and general assistance. Households with 
weaker family ties derive more benefit from community networks than households with 
larger family networks.
 ^ On the consequences o f migration networks in terms o f labour market performance and immigrants 
adjustements see Munshi (2003), Chiswick and Miller (2002), Gonzales (1998), Borjas (1995).
 ^ See Wilson (1998) on the importance o f weak ties in Mexican migration networks in the US and Grannovetter 
(1973, 1982) on the importance o f  weak ties, in general, in locating employment opportunities.
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Taylor (1986), in a model of household labour allocations under uncertainty 
emphasises the risk-reducing role of migration networks. Information, transmitted by 
established migi'ants, can improve the allocative efficiency of households’ labour decisions. 
In fact, their perception of the distribution of returns {subjective distribution) will match more 
accurately the true distribution {objective distribution). The value of accurate information is 
higher in the context of international migration, which is characterised by a high-risk 
environment, larger sunk costs (transportation, adjustment costs, psychical costs etc.) and 
scarcity of information. Migiation networks are expected to have a greater role in 
international than in internal migration. Econometric analysis using data collected in two 
Mexican villages confmns the predictions of Taylor’s model.
An additional explanation to immigrant clustering is given by the existence of “herd 
behaviour” in migiation. Epstein (2002) shows how potential migrants, who have some 
private information but are imperfectly informed about the attributes of alternative locations, 
might rationally decide to discount their private information and replicate the decisions taken 
by previous migrants. In his model, individuals are able to observe previous emigrants’ 
decisions but not the information signal that was driving those decisions. Herd behaviour 
might result in an inefficient equilibrium. Migrants may reg-et the choice taken and would 
have gained higher utility had they not followed the herd and chosen a different destination. 
This theory, based on “information cascades” between subsequent waves of migrants, should 
not be considered as a completely different explanation for clustering. Herd behaviour and 
networks externalities might clearly coexist. In our opinion, information cascades in 
Epstein’s theory are equivalent to the notion of “generic information” flows as developed by 
Nelson (1959). Generic information is often widespread without the active role or even the 
will of previous migrants. For instance, information about the locations chosen by people 
moving out of our village might be public knowledge. We might learn about it by talking
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with the butcher or barber of the village or sipping a coffee in the main square’s café, We can 
even form our suppositions on how successful a migrant is by looking, for instance, at his/her 
remittances home. Even if  not directly observable, migrant’s riches can be assessed by 
observing the consumption of the remittances’ beneficiaries. This public knowledge about 
migrants’ economic performances in a given destination might certainly induce “herd 
behaviour” and therefore subsequent migration waves, which are not triggered by an active 
role of established migrants.
Our model is based on a different premise. The information cascade theory explains 
immigrants clustering on the basis of the existence of imperfect information in a framework 
where established migrants have no active role in “recruiting” newcomers. In our theory, 
established migrants might play a very important role and their strategic decision whether or 
not to provide support to newcomers is linked to the interplay between positive ethnic 
consumption externalities and negative congestion costs. We are able to depict a richer 
framework which explains not only the formation of ethnic concentration but also the 
development of an ethnic productive sector in a particular location. Production of a rich set of 
ethnic goods and services is a striking feature of the various Chinatowns, Little Italys or Little 
Karachis around the world.
3, On ethnic goods and services
Consumption preference is one of the dimensions in which migrants often differ from the 
native population in the host locality. Immigrants from a particular ethnic gioup might have 
distinctive preferences toward a set of consumption varieties (which we define “ethnic goods 
and services”), not shared with the host population. Distinctiveness in consumption is 
particularly strong for etlmic migrants coming from source communities whose individuals
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share a strong cultural identity. Ethnic varieties are broadly defined to include both market 
and non-market goods and services. In the latter category will fall, for instance, social 
interactions between member of the same community of origin as noimal gatherings and 
celebration of certain specific religious festivals. The ethnic identity of these goods is linked 
to the fact that they address needs specific to the individual belonging to the ethnic 
community. In the consumption bundle of immigrants, ethnic goods and services might be of 
considerable importance. As a consequence, availability and prices of these goods in the host 
location might play an important role in shaping the location decision of ethnic migrants.
In order to understand how ethnic consumption might affect immigrants’ location 
decisions and the migration of an ethnic conmiunity, it is important to define first, the nature 
of ethnic commodities.
Some of these goods are tradable. Ethnic clothing, particular ingredients essential for 
preparing ethnic meals, CDs of Italian, Norwegian or Pakistani singers and DVDs of Tibetan 
or Chinese movies might all be traded over long distances. Availability of these tradable 
goods is, in principle, identical across potential localities in the host destination. Prices at 
different locations are however unlikely to be identical. Firstly, transportation costs might 
differ. Although for a single commodity transport costs might not be highly significant, the 
sum of these costs across the entire bundle of etlmic consumption might be considerable. If 
potential destinations are in different countries, duties and import taxes levied by national 
authorities, might contribute to price disparities. Secondly, and probably more significant, a 
certain amount of fixed costs are associated with the distribution of ethnic goods. Setting up a 
distribution channel is costly. As a consequence, the equilibrium price of an ethnic variety 
will be higher in locations with a smaller number of ethnic consumers. In addition, localities 
with a small number of ethnic consumers are likely to have only one or a limited number of 
suppliers/retailers of a particular product. The lack of competition in the retailing sector is
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likely to translate into higher prices. For example, if parmesan cheese is sold only in one shop 
in town, the shopkeeper will be able to extract greater surplus by acting as a local monopoly 
than if competition was fierce. In summary, for all these reasons, the price of a given bundle 
o f consumption of tradable ethnic commodities might be decreasing in the size of the ethnic 
community in the host location.
A considerable share of ethnic goods and services are non-tradable. Demand for a 
type of religious service or the service of a doctor applying traditional Chinese medicine both 
fall into this category. When the degree of social and cultural distance between the ethnic 
group and the host population is high, goods and services which are not per se ethnic might 
be considered so, in virtue of the fact that they are provided by members of the same ethnic 
group of the consumer. For example the service offered by a lawyer appear in general to have 
no distinctive ethnic component. Nevertheless, a Mexican immigrant in Los Angeles may 
prefer to use the services of a Hispanic lawyer than those of a non-Hispanic lawyer. The 
Mexican customer might have special consumer demands that a lawyer with an insider 
laiowledge of the ethnic’s group culture may be able to provide more effectively. 
Consequently, even if the price charged and the final results of the service are identical, the 
Mexican customer will probably find himself more at ease with a member of his own 
community and hence more likely to use their services. Non-pecuniary transaction costs in 
the trade between the lawyer and his client, such as language barriers, might be considerably 
reduced when these individuals belong to the same community of origin. The number of 
etlmic non-tradable varieties available in a particular host location is largely dependent on the 
intensity of preferences for ethnic consumption and on the size of the ethnic group. If the 
gi'oup is sufficiently large, it may support the existence in the host location of a differentiated
134
set of ethnic varieties. In many large cities across the world, immigration transforms some 
neighbourhoods into replicas of towns or communities of the source country.^
If ethnic consumption has a high value, a migrant will prefer, ceteris paribus, a 
location which offers a wide selection of ethnic goods at a lower price, i.e. a location with a 
large concentration of migrants from the same etlmic community.
Given the intrinsic nature of ethnic commodities, individuals belonging to the same ethnic 
group as the consumers are best suited at producing them. In practice, insider’s knowledge of 
the ethnic community’s culture is essential in providing goods and services closer to 
consumer tastes. Ethnic producers tend to have to a certain extent a protected market, i.e. a 
competitive edge over non-ethnic producers. In some cases, for certain goods and services, 
the market can be completely closed and ethnic producers are not only more able than others 
to satisfy demand but are in fact the only ones who can actually supply the ethnic market. An 
example, illustrated by Boyd (1998), is that of religious services demanded by African- 
American iimnigrants from the American South in urban northern areas during the Great 
Black Migration in the US. What was “ethnic” about these religious services? African 
Americans “were accustomed to services accompanied by improvisational singing, shouting 
and other form of active participation and demonstrative enthusiasm”. Pioneer migrants were 
dissatisfied with “intellectual sermons” and cold and impersonal large congiegations they 
found in the northern cities (Grossman, 1989). Large flows of southern migi'ants created the 
demand for churches and therefore, pastors travelling northward, who were better able to 
accommodate their special tastes.
From the above discussion it is clear that the number of both tradable and non-tradable 
varieties is highly likely to be positively affected by the size of the ethnic group in the host
® For an interesting sociological study on Hungarian immigrants in North America and their pattern of  
location/ethnic consumption during the first half o f 20*'' century see Rosa (1956).
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location. In what follows, we capture this idea in the simplest possible way by considering 
the existence of non-tradable varieties only.
4. The model
In order to analyse the relationship between individuals’ migration decisions, migration 
chains and preferences for non-tradable ethnic goods and services, we specify a simple model 
representing a single potential destination. This section is divided into three parts. In the first 
part the migiation behaviour and consumption preferences are presented. The production 
structure of the economy is specified in the second part, while in the last part, migration 
pattern and the optimal size of the ethnic group are analysed.
4.1 Migrant’s utility
A  migrant’s utility is defined over two types of goods and services, ethnic (E) and native (7). 
In line with our discussion above, we assume that, production of ethnic goods requires the 
employment of individuals of the same ethnic group as the consumers (i.e. the same source 
location). We assume that the goods and services are non-tradable, this means that the 
number of ethnic varieties available depends on the size of the ethnic group in a given 
locality.
Native goods are purely labour intensive (i.e. labour is the only input), where the 
labour pool consists of both migrants and natives. The two types of goods in the economy are 
produced in many differentiated varieties. We define n^ and Uy as the number of respectively 
type E  and type Y goods.
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utility of a representative migrant can be expressed by the following function/
V= ]{{\ + E ) c J d i+  ] { c y d j - ^ M  (1)
(=0 ,;=0
where ^ > 0 indicates that ethnic migrants particularly enjoy consumption of ethnic varieties. 
This formulation of the utility function implies that ethnic and non-ethnic goods and services 
are substitutes. Ethnic producers have “insider information” and particular skills which 
enable them to provide products closer to the taste and needs of ethnic consumers. As 
highlighted above, this might include the cooking of a particular meal, provision of religious 
services or simply the ordering and display of goods in the way it is done in the source 
country. The parameter e (0,l) captures the intensity for the love of variety in the utility
function; as ^ 0 , consumers derive more utility from product variety and as 6> 1, they
derive less utility from product variety, and represent respectively consumption of
good i , j  of type E  and Y. The last term on the right-hand-side ) captures the fact that as 
the size of the ethnic group in one location increases (M), i.e. as the ethnic community 
becomes more “visible”, migrants suffer from hostility and/or discrimination inflicted upon 
them by native inliabitants. For simplicity we assume a linear “hostility externality” measured 
by ^ > 0  times the size of the ethnie gi'oup M More generally, the hostility externality 
captures congestion costs of a different nature associated with a dimensional expansion of the 
ethnic community.
 ^ In what follows we use a modelling strategy for the migrants’ preferences similar to that employed by Glazer 
et al. (2003) in a different context.
For an interesting theoretical discussion concerning the “hostility externality” suffered by minority groups see 
Carlton (1995). Another interesting reading on hostility and the size o f a minority is Rapoport and Weiss (2003).
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We assume that each migrant is endowed with one unit of labour which is 
inelastically supplied in the individual’s location of residence. The budget constraint of a 
representative migrant is given by:
Ilf; I I Y
iPvU)^YU)41 (2)
i-o y=o
From equations (1) and (2) we obtain the following migrant’s demand for a single E  and Y 
variety (see Appendix I)'.
w
—  d’nj fPj f+HyPyE
wECy - rijfPff ^ Uy Py E
where s^~  (l/(l + £'))^ ^^ ‘ . Conversely, native individuals’ demand for a single native variety
might be expressed as:
(4)UyPy
where superscript ''naf identifies native variables. Native individuals do not benefit from 
ethnic varieties.
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4.2 Production technology
The two sectors of our economy have the same production technology. The only difference 
consists of the fact that the ethnic sector employs a specific factor of production, ‘ethnic 
labour’. Since all varieties, both of type E  and type 7, are symmetric in what follows we 
consider production of a representative firm irrespective of the type of products. Each variety 
is produced at decreasing average costs. An initial effort (fixed costs) is needed to set up a 
new business, and then each unit is produced at constant marginal cost. The labour input 
requirement for each variety is given by:
/,. = a  + J3xi (5)
where a , p  are respectively the fixed and the variable costs and x. is the output level of the
differentiated good or service. Love of variety and increasing returns at the firm level imply 
that each newcomer in the non-tradable sector will produce a new variety in order to capture 
some ‘monopolistic power’.
The profit-maximising price is a mark-up over the marginal costs (wage):
As long as excess profits exist, firms will continue to enter the market until profits are driven 
to zero, that is /r,. = p.x^ ~ {a  + p x ^ ) w - 0  . It follows that in equilibrium the optimal quantity 
produced by each fimi is:
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Substituting (7) into eq. (5) we obtain the optimal labour input requirement for each firm:
4.3 Size o f the ethnic group and number o f ethnic varieties
Migrants can be employed in either 7  or E  sectors. In addition, they can move freely 
between sectors, equalising wages in equilibrium. The number of ethnic and native varieties 
produced in equilibrium is demand driven (given by the share of income spent on ethnic and 
native goods and services).
When will an ethnic sector emerge? The first ethnic variety will be produced in the host 
location only if there is sufficient demand for it. In other words, migrants demand ( Mcy, ) is
sufficiently large to cover the break-even optimal quantity as defined by eq. (7). If this 
condition is not satisfied, i.e. the size of the migiants community is below a critical mass, 
migrants will be employed in the production of native varieties and consume only native 
products. In this case, migrants will have the following utility and their individual demand 
will be exactly as that of natives as defined by eq. (4):
] c y { p d j - ^ M  (9)
,/=o
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Equilibrium implies that goods and labour markets clear, that is, demand equals 
supply for each variety and all individuals are employed. When only the production of native 
varieties takes place equilibrium in the goods market is given by the following expression:
vr r ^  * ( M + L ) w a (  9M  + L  = Xy   — = — ------flyPy riyPy UyPy ^  \ l  ~ 9 ( 10)
where M , L  represent the size of the ethnic and native populations. By replacing eq. (6) into
(10) we find the equilibrium number of native varieties when an ethnic productive sector does 
not exist:
+ ( 1 1 )y, a  J
In a similar fashion, when the size of the ethnic community is large enough to sustain an 
ethnic productive sector, the equilibrium conditions in the goods markets for a representative 
ethnic (E) and native (Y) variety are as follows:
M c^=Xi,=>------ — ------I (12)
r w Mwe ' Lw a  ( 9Mcy + L  = =>--------------------+ ■
r i y P y  r i j , P i : - V n y P y £ '  U y  P  y  f  ~  9
where we assume that natives’ consumption of ethnic variety is equal to zero.
Substituting the equilibrium prices Pe = Py -  9 in (12) we obtain the following system:
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Mg = ----    -  TlySa
M s ' L a
I Mg + riyS' fly \ - 6
Solving these two equations yields the equilibrium number of varieties:
M r, =
Ls ' ~M ---------
I  «  y l - s ' _
f l y  =
(13) 
1-6») L
a  j l - s '
An ethnic productive sector will emerge ( «g > 0 ) if and only if the following condition is 
satisfied:
Condition 1; An ethnic sector exists i f  and only i f  the share o f migrants from the same ethnic 
community with respect to the native population (M  ! L) is larger than s'! { l - s ' ) .
We define M  as this threshold size of the ethnic community:
M  = ( 14)\ - s '
For a given level of the native population (L), the stronger migrants’ preference toward etlmic 
variety vis-à-vis native ones {s  large), the lower the critical mass of the migrants’ 
community for which an ethnic sector arises. In addition, the lower the intensity of the love-
for-variety ( -> 1 ), the lower will be M  . The intuition behind this last result follows from
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the faet that the higher 9 , the lower the gain in utility due to diversification of consumption. 
As a consequence, the ethnic migrant will shift expenditure toward consumption of the goods 
which provide him or her with the highest level of utility, i.e. ethnic varieties.
Proof: Ethnic and native variety use the same technology, i.e. the same labour input 
requirement . Given the amount of total labour available in the host location economy
(M  + L ), the following relationship holds: M y -  My + Mg -  (M  + Z) //,% As long as 
migrants in the host location find it more profitable to demand only native varieties no etlmic 
goods will be produced >V) .  Only when the marginal utility from having an ethnic
variety is equal to that of having an extra native one, will ethnic production start. The critical 
mass of migrants necessary to sustain an etlmic productive sector is found by solving the 
following equality = E . Using eqs. (1), (9), (11) and (13) and solving for M, we
obtain eq. (14). (see appendix 11) *
4,4 The pattern o f migration and the optimal size o f the ethnic group
4.4.1 The autonomous flow of migrants
All workers in the source location have the same level of skills and inelastically supply one 
unit of labour for which they are paid a wage rate ( ^ ) ,  which is only a fraction of the wage
offered in the host location (u%). However, migration is costly. In the source location, each
individual j  in the population { P )  faces a mobility cost Uj, which is broadly defined to
include the full cost of relocating in the new destination such as psychological costs, travel 
expenditure and the considerable amount of information required in order to take the decision
143
to migrate. Individuals face different mobility costs, which we assume to be continuously 
distributed on the interval, & a, a , where a and a identify the most mobile and more 
immobile individual in the population respectively.’ ' The fraction of population in the source
a,
region with a mobility cost equal to or lower than is given byF(a^.) = ^f{ci)P da , where
a
f  {a) is the probability density function for any particular level of migration cost a. F {a) is, 
therefore, the cumulative distribution function and is strictly positive, increasing and 
differentiable. A very simple and tractable case, which we will use in the following analysis,
is when mobility costs are uniformly distributed, that is for any
a . e .
On the basis of available information on potential destinations, an individual will move 
toward the destination (if any) which maximises his/her utility net of migration costs. The 
first individual (or gi'oup of individuals) will migrate if utility in the host location net of 
migration costs is higher than utility at home. Formally, if V ,-V^ > a . individual j  will
migrate, where F}, and are indirect utility levels in the host and source destinations 
respectively. Without loss of generality and only for analytical convenience, we assume that 
the availability of ethnic varieties in the source location is fixed at a given level and migration 
is relatively small so that it does not have any detrimental effect on the number of varieties 
produced at home. This implies that we can treat the utility associated with the source locality 
as fixed at a constant level F
" These captures the fact that some individuals are more mobile than others for factors such as personal and 
household characteristics (age, gender, homeowners etc.), the degree of involvement in community life in the 
origin region and exogenously given preferences over the home location.
We acknowledge that migration flows sometimes might have detrimental effects on the source economy. That 
is particularly true if  migration is highly selective towards more skilled individuals, as is often the case. In our 
model we rule out this consideration since we are exclusively interested in investigating the pattern o f migration 
flows rather than the consequences thereof on those left behind in the source location,
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In our simple two-locations model, the initial autonomous flow of migrants’ (M, ) depends 
on the utility differential (explained by both the exogenous wage rate differential and the 
endogenous availability/composition of non-tradable varieties) and the distribution among the 
population of ‘mobility costs’ in the source location. For a given set of expected host/source 
utility levels, the marginal migrant of the initial migration flow (M, ), which is indifferent 
between migrating or staying at home has the following mobility cost:’"’
« , = n ( V ) - f  (15)
The corresponding size of the initial ethnic migiant community is given by:
M ^ - ^ f { a ) P d a  (16)
A corner solution with no migration (complete de-population) arises when equation (15) is
never satisfied and a j > V , \ M) - V ^  ( aj < F), (M ) ~ ) for any a j e . In what follows
we concentrate our attention on the pattern of migration in the case of an internal solution, 
0 < M, < P , i.e. a positive and finite initial flow of migrants.
Since etlmic goods are initially not available in the host destination, a relatively large 
wage gap could be necessary to kick-start migration. The most mobile individuals of the 
source location (if migration takes place) will compose the initial flow of migrants.
Equation (16) measures the size of the ethnic community in the host locality without 
strategic support from established migrants to potential incoming migrants.
While the setting o f our model is fundamentally static, its interpretation is implicitly dynamic as it is 
frequently the case in the economic literature aimed at analysing the spatial structure o f  the economy.
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In what follows, we analyse the effect of incoming migrants from the same source 
community on the utility of established migrants. In addition, we show how the active role of 
established migrants in supporting newcomers enables us to depict a rich set of possible 
scenarios in terms of patterns of migration and ethnic community size in the host locality.
4.4.2 The effect of newcomers on established migrants’ utilitv and the optimal size of the 
ethnic communitv
Once in the new location, established migrants have an incentive to give support to 
newcomers only if new migrants have a positive effect on their utility. Potential gains from 
incoming migration in terms of utility are endogenous and depend on the size of the resulting 
ethnic community in the host location. In the context of our model, different scenarios may 
emerge according to the size of the initial, autonomous flow of migrants (M, ), the degree of 
migrants’ preferences toward the ethnic goods and services (s ) ,  and the reaction of natives to 
increasing immigration flows (hostility externality, ).
Ethnic varieties will be available in the host localities only if condition I is satisfied, 
that is a critical mass M  of ethnic migrants is already settled in the host locality. The effects 
of incoming migrants will therefore differ according to the existence (or not) of an ethnic 
productive sector. Two cases emerge.
Case 7. No ethnic productive sector (size of the initial pool of migrants M  > M, )
If the size of the initial ethnic community is smaller than the critical mass needed to establish 
an ethnic sector, migrants will initially consume only native non-tradable goods and services. 
Indirect utility in this case is:
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1 a fr ,:'= {L  + M y  \ - ] \ ------ (17)
K flJ  \. a  J
From the above equation it follows that the effect of further immigration on the utility of the 
established migrants depends on the trade-off between the positive native variety expansion 
effect and the negative effect due to increasing ethnic discrimination/congestion costs.
The optimal size of the migrant community is reached when the two opposite effects 
are balanced, i.e. dV / dM -  0. We call this threshold level M**, which is given by the 
following expression:
^ n \  2-0 I
J  (1 -g )  0 a  0 - L  (18)
J
This size of the ethnic community is realised when only all individuals with mobility cost 
a<Oj <  M find it convenient to migrate, where a** is the threshold level of mobility cost for
which M'"' -  H f [ a ) Pd a
Case 2. Ethnic productive sector (size of the initial pool of migrants M^> M )
When the size of the community is larger than or equal to M , an ethnic productive sector is 
set up. Indirect utility of the established migrants (and for incoming migrants) in this case is:
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V, =M^ a ( 19)
Also in this situation a trade-off associated with subsequent immigration exists. The only 
difference is in the nature of the positive externality, which in this second case is due to an 
ethnic variety expansion effect.
Also for this case, in which the initial autonomous flow of migrants is above M  , we 
compute the optimal size of the ethnic community:
6{l + s) 2 - 0  J( l ~9 )  & a   ^ ^   ^ (20)
We define a as the level of mobility cost associated with M* -  J [  /  {a) P da .
The optimal size of the ethnic community in Case 1 is always smaller than in Case 2, 
i.e. M* > M** (see Appendix 111).
Figure 1 depicts the level of utility that migrants enjoy in the host location (net of the 
constant level enjoyed in the source country F/,_, = F/, -  ) as a function of the ethnic
community size. When the ethnic community in the host location has a size below (above) 
the tlneshold size M , Fj/ > Fj* (F'/"’“< F /). Migrants’ utility is given by eq. (19) when
M > M , and by eq. (17) when M < M . Three different cases are shown. Diagram (a) 
represents the situation in which M  < M^* < M " . This case is characterised by relatively 
strong preferences for etlmic products, a low degree of love for variety and/or low hostility
externalities. The marginal migrant for which an ethnic sector is set up, a (where
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M = r  f{a)P da  ), has a mobility cost lower than a " . An intermediate case, where
M** < M  < M" , is reported in diagram (b), while diagram (c) represents a case opposite to 
the first one where M*" < M* < M .
The upward sloping line in the diagrams, C{P) , represents mobility costs across the 
population in the source locality when these are uniformly distributed. The relevant equation 
in this simple and tractable case is:
C{P) = a + P / (21)
where the intercept a is the mobility cost of the most mobile individual in the source region 
and the slope might be interpreted, for a given population P  in the source locality, as a 
measure of mobility costs dispersion.
The relationship between M  and the two optimal sizes, M*and defined above 
is important in understanding the alternative scenarios depicted by our model and which are
investigated in the next section. In table 1, we report the sign of the derivatives of M , M" 
and with respect to the main variables of the model.
149
Table 1. The effects of model’s parameters and variables on M  , M^‘ and M"* (sign of the 
first derivative)
Ethnic
preferences
£
Love of 
variety
e
Congestion
costs
Fixed costs 
of
production
a
Variable 
costs of 
production
P
Size of 
native 
population
L
M 0 0 0 0
+ +  / -  * — — — 0
0 +  / -  * — — —
* = both signs according to the size o f other parameters
As already mentioned in section 43 , the threshold level M  is decreasing in the 
intensity of preferences toward ethnic consumption vis-à-vis native consumption { e )  and is 
increasing in intensity of love for variety. The optimal size of the ethnic group when an 
etlmic sector already exists is increasing in s . More migrants in the host localities expand the 
set of ethnic variety available to the whole ethnic community. When preferences for these 
goods are strong, this positive effect will dominate the negative effects over a larger size of 
the community. On the other hand, M* is decreasing in congestion costs and in labour 
costs of production ( a , p ) .  More ambiguous are the signs of both dM'" tdO and dM"’' ! dO , 
which depend jointly on the size of other parameters in a non-linear way.
Note that an increase in the native population L , has a negative impact on M**. This 
result is obvious from eq. (18) and is due to the fact that the bigger the native population, the 
gi'eater is the number of varieties already available in the host locality. Therefore, the positive
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native expansion effect associated with incoming migrants could be more than offset by 
negative externalities. When negative externalities are particularly strong, both M" and M*"' 
might be negative, which means that the optimal size of the ethnic community is zero.
In figure 2, M , M" and M** are plotted against e keeping all other parameters 
fixed at a certain level. When preferences toward type E goods are only marginally higher
than those for native varieties (in the figure: ^ < s < A), M  is bigger than M* and M"". This 
situation corresponds to diagram (c) in figure 1. Stronger ethnic preferences will lead to the 
alternative two cases depicted in figure 1.
4.4.3 Strategic support and the size o f the ethnic community: alternative scenarios
After having outlined the general framework of our analysis, in this section we define the 
migration pattern under alternative scenarios. The main questions we want to address are the 
following:
(i) When will established migrants provide support to newcomers?
(ii) What is the resulting size of an etlmic gi'oup?
(iii) Is the resulting size equal to the optimal size?
(iv) When does an ethnic productive sector arise?
The set of possible scenarios predicted by the model is reported in table 2. In what follows 
we define the conditions under which each scenario arises and describe the underlying 
migiation pattern.
By giving support to potential newcomers, whether sending them information on job 
opportunities in the host location or giving direct support in order to reduce initial difficulties
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and uncertainty, established migrants influence the size of the flows.’"’ Therefore, if positive 
externalities arise as a consequence of a larger size of the ethnic community in the host 
location, established migrants might strategically use ‘support’ as a way of internalising those 
externalities.
Definition 1: The utility gain (or loss) experienced by a community o f established migrants 
o f size as the ethnic community expands up to a size Mj is given by
G{M„M,) = M , [ v „ y M y - V „ y M ÿ  ' '=
Proposition 1: For a given size o f the ethnic community already in the host location, M ^,
established migrants strategically support newcomers i f  and only i f  the following condition is 
satisfied:
< M" , i.e. the size of the ethnic community is initially smaller than the optimal size M* ;
Proof. If the above condition is not satisfied and >M*,  established migrants’ utility is 
decreasing in M  since dV,^  / dM < 0 for any M  e ] .  It follows that G[M, . ,Mj ) < 0 .
Migi'ants already settled in the host locality experience a utility loss as a consequence of 
incoming migrants, therefore no support will be provided.®
When M , ^ < M \  there exists a M j &{^M,.,M") such that
G{^M ^ ,M  j)>  V,^_^[M)dM > 0 ; i.e. the gain experienced by established
And in a multi-location framework the direction o f  the flows.
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migrants in terms of consumption externalities is larger than the support needed by a number 
of incoming migrants of size (m j ~ ) in order to be indifferent between migrating or
remaining in the home location.
The total optimal support S" will be: 
s '  = J"'" C {M) d M -  £'*" ( M) dM  (22)
where is the size of the ethnic community after the new migrants triggered by the
support are settled in the host location. At , the marginal gain of having a new migrant is 
equal to the marginal support that would be necessary to induce him/her to migrate:
dM dM
Before we proceed with depicting the different scenarios reported in table 2, it is 
convenient to define the equilibrium size of the ethnic community as follows:
Definition 2: The size o f an ethnic community in the host location reaches a stable 
equilibrium ( M ^ ) when:
(i) d G [ M ' ^ ) l d M i d \ c [ M y - V „ _ , [ M f l ô M o {  ô g (M * )/5 M < 0 ;
For the autonomous initial “mass” o f  migrants, =  M , as defined by equation (16).
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(ii) for any individual with mobility cost üj e , where f{a)P cla , the cost
of migrating is larger than the associated net gain in utility, formally 
Cj{M(ay>V„yM(ayy
The interpretation of this definition is straightforward. A stable equilibrium, , is achieved 
at a point in which established migi’ants have no incentive to further support incoming 
migrants and all individuals left behind in the source location have no incentive to migiate 
due to their high mobility costs. Condition (i) is necessary but not sufficient. A new group of 
individuals in the source location might find it profitable to migrate without support since the 
ethnic community has expanded to a level which more than compensates for their mobility 
costs.
For the community strategic support to be effective, we must assume that established 
migrants act like a ‘cohesive group’ and are able to control and prevent free riding behaviour 
within the group so that all components contribute to the supportive action. In general ethnic 
minorities show a high degree of co-operation and mutual support, which probably is due to 
their ability to prevent opportunistic behaviour and enforce trust. For instance, it is frequently 
observed that informal financing within an ethnic minority is often a common way of 
obtaining credit. As emphasised by the literature, informal financing is usually the preferred 
option within communities where monitoring is more intense, costs of information about a 
debtor are very low and enforcement mechanisms are more effective.
This will happen when the size o f the ethnic community in the host destination is still lower than the optimal 
size (M^ < M* ) and therefore utility o f  established and incoming migrants is increasing in the size o f  the 
community, dV,,_ J  dM > 0  - The migrants triggered by support {induced migrants) are followed by a new flow o f
autonomous migrants composed by individuals who previously had incentive to stay put. As a consequence o f  
the expansion o f  the ethnic community, and therefore the availability o f more ethnic varieties, these individuals 
subsequently found it profitable to migrate even without support from established migrants.
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Established migrants’ support is fundamental in expanding the host locality ethnic 
community through subsequent induced migration flows. Their effort might lead to the 
formation of an ethnic productive sector.
Figure 3, scenario 1, illustrates the theoretical case characterised by (i) established 
migrants support to newcomers, (ii) the emergence o f an ethnic productive sector and (iii) an 
equilibrium size o f the ethnic community equal to the optimal size M^ -=M \ Individuals 
composing the initial pool of migrants, M ,, have an incentive to support newcomers since in 
doing so they might achieve a higher level of utility for themselves. The optimal amount of 
support provided is given by the total area between C (M ) and V;,_^  (M ) as defined by eq. 
(22). As reported in table 2, this scenario is likely to arise when:
a) Migrants in the source locality have very strong preferences for ethnic goods and services 
vis-à-vis native ones. In this situation, the critical mass of migrants necessary to set up an 
ethnic sector is small. This is often the case for ethnic migrants with cultural, religious 
and soeial preferences very dissimilar from those of the host country. The migration cost 
in this case is generally higher since immigi'ants find it more difficult to assimilate into 
the mainstream society, and individuals will be willing to pay more in order to recreate 
the source country environment. A native language different from that of the host country 
will work in the same direction (see Bauer et al. 2002).
b) Mobility costs of potential incoming migrants are not prohibitively high (but neither too 
small, see scenario 2). The support necessary to induce incoming migrants to join the 
"ethnic club” in the host location should not be too large. Established migrants’ support, 
in this case, will be positive until the ethnic community reaches the optimal size
=M" . Above this size no support will be provided since, dG{M")I dM <Q, i.e. 
expansion of the community above this threshold will have detrimental effect on
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established mi giants’ utility since the hostility externality dominates the positive 
consumption externality,
c) Hostility externalities or congestion costs are low.
The optimal size of the community will differ from the optimal one in scenario 2
(established migrants support newcomers, an ethnic productive sector is set up and the ethnic 
community size is A M ") under two circumstances. Firstly, when mobility costs for those 
left behind in the source population are high (i.e. C (M ) is steep). In this circumstance,
established migrants find it profitable to support up to a level where the marginal gain of 
having an extra migrant is equal to its marginal cost. The resulting equilibrium size of the 
community is smaller than the optimal, < M " . Secondly, the equilibrium size will differ 
from the optimal size also in the case of low mobility costs in the population (i.e. C (M ) is
flat). This case is depicted in figure 3. The ethnic variety expansion effect, caused by the 
settlement of new migrants, will exert an attraction force also for other individuals in the host 
location who, therefore, benefit indirectly from established migrants’ support. Joining the 
“migration club” becomes profitable also for them.’^
For weak preferences toward the ethnic goods and relatively low hostility externalities, 
the likely outcomes are those represented in figure 4 (scenarios 3 and 4). an etlmic 
productive sector is not set up in any of the cases but we still observe support by established 
migi’ants to newcomers. Equilibrium size of the ethnic community is in scenario 3
and A M** in scenario 4.
A strategic use o f remittances in the source location might in principle prevent further migration and act as a 
means o f achieving the optimal size. Even by including strategic remittances in the analysis, scenario (2) is still 
a possible outcome for very low mobility costs since the strategic remittances required to induce individuals to 
stay put might be too large for = M*to be a feasible equilibrium.
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When preferences for ethnic consumption are strong but mobility costs in the source 
locality are rather low, the likely outcome is depicted in figure 5 (scenario 5). Migrants have 
a strong preference for ethnic consumption and therefore an ethnic sector is likely to emerge. 
Established migrants have no incentive to support newcomers, and the mobility cost curve 
C (M ) cuts the utility cuiwe (M ) in a point where negative externalities dominate 
positive ones.
Finally, no support and no ethnic productive sector will characterise the migratory 
experience in the presence of relatively low preferences for etlmic goods associated with 
strong congestion costs when migration costs are low (figure 5, scenario 6). In these last two 
scenarios, the equilibrium size of the ethnic community is equal to the size of the initial 
autonomous flow of migrants M, = .
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we provide a theory of migration networks and ethnic communities formation 
based on the existence of immigi'ants’ preferences toward etlmic non-tradable goods and 
services which only individuals belonging to the same ethnic community can provide. In our 
model, established immigi’ants play a key role in determining the migratory experience of the 
ethnic community through the strategic use of support to reduce mobility costs of subsequent 
migrants. The model is able to produce a rich set of scenarios, which we argue are in line 
with the heterogeneous migration pattern showed by different ethnic groups.
The more different the cultural, political and economic environment the region of 
origin is from that of the region of destination, the higher the probability that ethnic migi’ants 
will cluster together in a selected number of communities. In addition, the larger will be the 
resulting size of the ethnic minority since established migrants will be willing to devote more
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effort to support newcomers in order to recreate, at least in part, the economic, religious and 
cultural environment they left behind at home.
Incoming migrants expand the set of ethnic non-tradable varieties which are produced 
in the host locality. This effect is undoubtedly positive on migrants already settled in the 
ethnic cluster. Nevertheless, migrants compete over scarce resources such as housing and job 
opportunities. In addition, as human history shows, as ethnic minority expands in the host 
destination the probability of hostile and discriminatory behaviour toward them from the 
native population increases as well. In our model we show that coexistence of these positive 
and negative externalities determines an “optimal size” of the ethnic community. The actual 
size of the community may well be different from the optimal size.
The model’s predictions match some important findings observed in empirical 
studies. When a group of migrants has similar preferences to those of the native population in 
the host country, our model predicts more dispersed migration flows that are mainly driven 
by regional differences in economic fundamentals (real wages, unemployment rate, etc.). 
This should be the case for internal migration which involves individuals characterised by 
relatively homogeneous preferences. In this regard, the model is in line with the different 
geographical patterns of internal versus international migration flows frequently found in 
empirical studies. Immigrants are generally more geographically concentrated than natives 
and reside in cities with a large population of the same ethnic group (see for instance Bartel 
1989).
Often ethnic clusters tend to die with the ageing of the first generation of established 
migrants. On the basis of the premises of our model this phenomenon could be explained by 
decreasing attachment to “ethnic consumption” and increasing assimilation into native 
society by descendants of those individuals.
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Interesting extensions of the model and alternative formulation are possible. First, it 
would be interesting to extend the model by considering a multi-location framework. The 
advantage would be one of analysing not only the size of the ethnic community but also the 
direction of migration in a richer set. Once a “migration club” has eroded its attractiveness, 
new destinations might emerge and the migratory pattern is replicated in the new destination. 
Second, considering more explicitly the welfare of native population and endogenising the 
congestion/hostility externalities could considerably enrich the migration pattern described 
above.
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Table 2 -  Migration pattern: features of alternative scenarios
Strategic support by established migrants
Yes No
Yes
Ethnic
Sector
No
Optim al size o f  the ethnic coinm im ity
Yes
Scenario (1)
Strong preferences for 
etlmic goods and service 
( e ^ h ig h ) ' ,
Large dispersion o f  
mobility costs in the 
source location
population, (slope o f  
C { M ) ,  i.e.
y  [ a - a ) -> relatively
small)-,
Low hostility
externalities ->  low ).
No
Scenario (2)
Strong preferences for 
ethnic goods and service 
{e-S'high)'.
Very large {very small) 
dispersion o f mobility 
the source 
population 
C (M ), i.e.
either
costs in 
location 
(slope of
very
large or very small)-.
Low hostility
externalities {^  S  low ).
Scenario (5)
Strong preferences for 
ethnic goods and 
service { e - ^  high)'. 
Small dispersion o f  
mobility costs in the 
source location
population (slope o f  
C (M ), i.e.
y  [ a - a ) -> large)-.
High hostility
externalities
{ f , s l o w ) .
Optim al size o f  the ethnic com m unity ^
Yes
Scenario (3)
Weak preferences for
ethnic goods and service 
( £■ —> 0 );
Large dispersion o f
mobility costs in the
source location
population, (slope o f
C [ M ) ,  i.e.
-^relatively
small)-,
Low hostility
externalities (^  —> low ).
No
Scenario (4)
Weak preferences for 
ethnic goods and service 
{£ —> 0 );
Very large {very small) 
dispersion o f mobility 
the source 
population 
C (M ),  i.e.
l / ( a - a ) - >  either very
large or very small)-,
Low hostility
externalities (^  -4^  low ).
cost in 
location 
(slope of
Scenario (6)
Weak preferences for 
ethnic goods and 
service (6" -4- 0  );
Small dispersion o f  
mobility costs in the 
source location
population (slope of  
C (M ),  i.e.
yiÿi-fj^large)-.
High hostility
externalities
{ ^ s - l o w ) .
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Appendix I:
In the destination location, given a certain wage level (w), the migrant maximises utility (1) 
subject to the budget constraint (2), we set up the Lagrangian;
llj; >Iy llj; llj;
L -  j  ((l + 6')Cg.)'^Æ+ ^ s)cY^jf d j - ^M- V/ I  w -  j  j  PrfYj^)
/=0 ./=0 i=0 i=0
(A.1)
the F.O.Cs. for (A .l) are the following;
d l  / = 6*((1 + G)cEif '(1 + g) ~Ep^.  = 0 (A. 1.1)
dL! dCyi = 0{CyjŸ  ^—Xpyf -  0 (A. 1.2)
ÔL/ÔÀ = W~ J PeiCeJH-  J PyjCYjdj = 0
i=Q /= 0
re-arranging (A. 1.1 )- (A. 1.3) we get:
(A. 1.3)
Ei
, Pei j
\-0 (! + £■)' ; Cy, —
V P v  J
(A. 1.4)
Given that E  and Y varieties are produced using the same 1RS technology, = pyj and
defining as in Glazer et al (2003) 6-' = (1/(1 + , from (A. 1.4) it follows:
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(A. 1.5)
It is worth noting that 0 < g ' < l ,  therefore eq. (A. 1.5) indicates that the amount consumed of 
a Y good is only a fraction of that of an E  good; this is obvious given that migrants attach 
more value to non-tradable ethnic varieties. Besides, as love-of-variety {6 )  and migrants’ 
preference for etlmic variety (£*) increase, migrants will shift consumption from native to 
etlinic varieties {ds' l  ds <Q and ds'! ds <0).
Using the budget constraint and (A. 1.5) we can write the migrants’ demand for a single E and 
Y variety as follows:
w^Ei = --------,--------- ; ; Cy. =^EPE-^^yPyS'
W£
^ ePe nyPyS (A. 1.6)
Appendix II:
Using (3), (4) and (6) into (1) and (9), = v
W0
=  « . (1 + s) w9nppw-vriyfws' + YIy
W0s'
r ip P w +nypw s '
substituting (11) and (13) into this last expression yields:
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{M + L)\ \ - e\  a
e
r
\ — 0
V 1 - g ' A  cc (1+^)
6
M Ls '  V 1\ ~ s
+
+ {  ^ 1f  1 - # ^[ l - s ' J  ^ Of y Os^ \ - e
a PsV J
~  Ls'If we substitute in the above expression, condition 1 M = ------- , we obtain:
\ - s '
\ - e
y tio _ e llw ic  _  y
0
L
\ - s ' a  J
^ L ^
\ \ - s  J
\ ~ d
a
6
L
f U - s '
^ 1-5»^
\  a  ) P
Appendix III:
Comparing equations ( 18) and (20) it is easy to check that M ’ is always larger than M “ :
-G I
M *-M^* = ^ { \ - 9) 9 a  ° [g + Z j > 0 (A.3.1)
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Analogously it can be shown that, for any M > M = Z, , utility in case 2 is always\ - s '
higher than in case 1. Using (17) and (19) and given that there exists a ^//e]0,l[ for which 
£ 'M w  = M  = L   we have:
“  1 - g '
0_
jJ
A M'-o(\  + e ) " - M  +........ .........^
1-61
/ {, a  ) I  ;
-  (A.3.2)
f  a ' f  C\ û \e_
P.
\ - e
y  ot J >0
where the last term in square brackets is always positive (since 0 < f ' < l ,  V g >0  and 
V ^ e ]0 , l [ ) .
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